JOHN W. HOLMES MEMORIAL LECTURE

A Pivotal Moment in Global Governance?
Looking Back to Look Forward

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Many of us are often asked how we became who we are. For me, that has generally come down to the old adage—nature (genes) or nurture (parental influence), and the latter is pretty strong in my case. My father, Norman J. Padelford, was one of the early scholars of international organization (IO) and the United Nations. He was one of a number of academics who were recruited by the US Department of State during World War II as consultants to work on the preparation of the UN and other issues. After participating in the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference and the April 1945 meetings of the UN Committee of Jurists in Washington, DC, he served as executive officer for Commission IV of the UN San Francisco Conference Secretariat, which dealt with all arrangements concerning the International Court of Justice and such other legal matters as were referred to in the draft Charter. In the closing days of the conference, he was made secretary of the jurists committee that directed the work of drafting the Charter. In 1946, he moved from the Fletcher School to MIT to develop courses in international relations. He was a founding editorial board member and later chairman for the journal International Organization (1960–1973). He died in 1982 before his friend Gene Lyons and others founded the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) and invited me as a then relatively junior scholar at the University of Dayton to be part of the ACUNS founding conference and to give the presentation “Teaching International Organization.” So, the story of the UN’s founding has always, in part, had a personal dimension for me, as has much of the history of the study of the UN and international organizations.

It is a great honor to be invited to give this John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture and, I must confess, I have adapted Holmes’s own title for his inaugural address in 1988. The theme of “looking backward, looking forward” seems particularly apt to me. First, because this address is an opportunity for me to pay brief tribute to my past and my father’s influence in my becoming a scholar of international organizations. Second, because this month marks the thirtieth anniversary of the conference at which ACUNS was founded. As a participant in that event, it is an opportunity for me to
look back over these thirty years at what ACUNS has accomplished. Third, it has also been thirty years since John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil, as well as Martin Rochester, published their two articles in the journal *International Organization* on the “state of the field” at that point. Realizing that no one has written a follow-up essay on the subject, I want to devote part of my remarks to how far the field has come in that interval, thanks in part to ACUNS’s influence, and then to comment in looking forward on what I see as some of the major gaps in the field and the major challenges that we as practitioners and scholars of the UN and global governance, as well as the UN itself, face at this particularly pivotal juncture in time. Finally, being here in Seoul, looking backward I recall that it was here in Korea that the UN first undertook a collective security action in response to North Korea’s aggression supported by the newly established People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Looking forward, it is clear that the division of Korea and North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile delivery capabilities pose major challenges to the UN, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the international community more generally. Furthermore, South Korea’s own Ban Ki-moon recently completed ten years as the UN’s eighth Secretary-General with the success of the 2015 Paris conference on climate change among his major accomplishments.

**ACUNS at Thirty**

Thirty years ago this month, I was privileged to be among those invited to Dartmouth College for a conference whose purpose was to create a new organization to stimulate and support research and teaching on the role of the UN system in international relations. There was a shared sense among a number of scholars at the time that activities at the United Nations University and throughout the UN system

simply were not connecting with research and teaching taking place in outside universities and research centers. . . . Research on international peace and security and on social and economic development . . . seemed to have little impact on what was actually going on . . . and there appeared to be a continued decline in research on the UN itself and on the institutions of the UN system.¹

As Lyons notes in his history of ACUNS’s founding, this disconnect was not new. It had been noted in 1970 by Stanley Hoffman² and in 1983 by Inis Claude.³ To observers of international affairs, it was obvious that the UN was largely irrelevant to major issues of international security and international political economy, and it was caught up in the North-South conflict over the proposed New International Economic Order (NIEO) and related issues. In the United States, this decline was matched by UN bashing in foreign policy and action by Congress to withhold US dues. The teaching of
international organization especially in the United States had declined and there were few doctoral students writing dissertations about the UN system, which had implications for the future of university teaching.

Details of the founding of ACUNS can be found at the ACUNS website under “History” and also in the full text of Lyons’s narrative “Putting ACUNS Together,” cited in note 1. However, that story includes a number of key people besides Lyons, among them the distinguished sociologist and peace activist Elise Boulding who had been on the board of the United Nations University and the faculty of Dartmouth College; Benjamin Rivlin, director of the Ralph Bunche Institute at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York; John Fobes, former deputy director-general of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); Oran Young, then at the Dickey Center at Dartmouth College; James P. Sewell of Brock University; John Holmes, by then on the faculty of the University of Toronto; and Victor Urquidi who had early UN experience in the Secretariat of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and had been president of the Colegio de México.

In many respects, ACUNS was conceived and developed by academics who also had experience as practitioners within the UN system. The goal was not to advocate for the UN, but to encourage the study of the UN system and the teaching of international organization more generally. The goal was also more than just to create a new professional association. As Lyons notes, “It was also to recognize that international organizations were taking on new operations and changing the structures of international relations,” as well as new organizational issues and persistent long-standing ones that raised “theoretical and policy questions about international organization that needed to be researched and analyzed.”4 Thus, he says, “The ultimate aim is to encourage a new generation of scholars, teachers, and practitioners to give new and critical attention to the role of international organizations in world affairs.”5

From that first conference in 1987, then, ACUNS’s agenda included information and documentation services, research, and teaching. A year after the founding conference, it convened the first annual conference in New York at which the inaugural Holmes Lecture was given—although unfortunately not by Holmes himself who was too ill to attend. Also in 1988, Donald Puchala and Roger Coate produced the State of the United Nations report, which became the first of a series of occasional papers and reports published by ACUNS. In 1991, the first ACUNS workshop for junior scholars and practitioners was held at Dartmouth College. Among the participants was Abiodun Williams, current board member and former board chair of ACUNS. I had the privilege of conducting the session “Teaching International Organization.” In 1995 after the executive directorship of ACUNS had passed to Thomas Weiss and Brown University, the
journal *Global Governance* was launched under the editorship of Craig Murphy and Roger Coate, and just two years thereafter was named “the best new journal in the United States in Business, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities” by the Association of American Publishers. In 1994, an annual Dissertation Fellowship Award was launched. From the beginning, the Ralph Bunche Center at City University of New York functioned as an ACUNS-UN liaison office to assist scholars seeking to do research at the UN and to facilitate ACUNS’s links to the UN. Subsequently, liaison offices have been established in Geneva, Vienna, New Delhi, and Tokyo. In addition, ACUNS has organized periodic seminars in New York for UN and diplomatic staff. ACUNS’s membership was initially limited to North America, given the founding by Canadian, US, and Mexican scholars and practitioners. Membership is now truly global with sixty-five countries represented, and that fact is underscored by this first annual conference held in Asia, following conferences in Latin America, Europe, and Turkey, and the 2016 workshop held in India. Twenty-six percent of current members are practitioners, with the balance being scholars, researchers, and student members.

Unquestionably, ACUNS has met its goal of stimulating teaching and research on the UN system and international organizations. The IO Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) is one of its largest sections with over 700 members. Books relating to global governance, IOs, and the UN continue to proliferate, reflecting the wide range of interest and high-quality research being done in the field. The journal *Global Governance* has provided a valuable niche for connecting research and practice with relatively short accessible articles aimed at both audiences. The journal *International Organization* marks its seventieth anniversary this year and continues to be a premiere journal in the fields of international organization and international political economy. Meanwhile, other journals have sprung up in the field such as *Review of International Organizations* and *Journal of International Organizations Studies* to provide IO scholars with more outlets for their work, and the number of issue-specific journals publishing IO-related work such as *International Peacekeeping, Global Responsibility to Protect, Review of International Political Economy*, and *Global Environmental Politics* continues to grow. Also, mainline journals such as the *American Political Science Review* and *International Studies Quarterly* frequently have IO- and UN-related articles. And this is just to cite some publications in English!

At thirty, ACUNS can congratulate itself on all it has accomplished, but it cannot be complacent. Looking forward, it faces a transition in its headquarters and leadership after fifteen years at Wilfred Laurier University: a new editorial team for its journal *Global Governance*; the opportunity to develop a new book series with Elgar Publishing; and the realities
of limited foundation and other support for many of its core activities. It is time to take stock of where ACUNS is in what I call the “organizational life cycle”; what its members—both scholars and practitioners—want and need it to do, and what resources can be secured to accomplish these things.

**The State of the Field**

A year before the founding of ACUNS, two articles appeared in the journal *International Organization* reviewing the evolution of the field of international organization since the end of World War II and the founding of the UN. A little over a year ago, as I was preparing to teach an IO course at the doctoral level for the first time and assigned my students the Ruggie and Kratochwil and Rochester articles, it struck me that no one has undertaken such a review since then. And while I don’t propose to offer one here, I would like to briefly outline how rich the sequence of major themes and foci in the field has been. Please note, however, that my observations primarily reflect work published in North America and in English and, hence, my apologies to colleagues from the Global South, Asia, and even Europe.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, there had been three primary innovations in international relations scholarship relating to IOs: work on international political economy and the effects of interdependence as well as of hegemonic stability and international regime theory. This was undergirded by extensive work on theories of cooperation. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were among the lead authors along with Ruggie and others. Keohane and Nye had also edited a special issue of *International Organization* that focused on transgovernmental and transnational networks, organizations, and links, but it would be nearly twenty years before the ideas put forward in that issue took hold and bore significant fruit. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, work on international regimes continued to develop the theory and apply the concept, although it was not uncommon to find some authors conflating regimes with specific international organizations, ignoring the normative and rule components of the concept. More recently, there has been further development of the concept of regime complexes and attention related to issues of orchestration.

One major innovation at the end of the 1980s was the introduction of constructivism as a powerful new approach to analyzing the creation, evolution, and diffusion of norms, as well as the introduction of the concept of soft law. It would be fair to say that constructivism has become a dominant approach in IO scholarship since then. The second major innovation was the introduction of the concept of global governance—a term first used by James Rosenau and Otto Czempiel in their edited volume *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. The
concept was popularized by the publication of Our World Neighborhood, the report of the Commission on Global Governance released in conjunction with the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations in 1995. And I might suggest it gained a major boost among scholars with the launch of the ACUNS journal Global Governance in that same year. Although debate about the value of the concept of global governance persists to this day, there is no doubt that it has inspired a rich scholarly literature on a wide range of governance issues from the environment to migration and human rights.  

Complementing the introduction of the concept of global governance in the 1990s was work on multilateralism and multilateral institutions as theory and practice. And picking up an element of Keohane and Nye’s 1971 volume on transnational and transgovernmental linkages was the introduction by Peter Haas and others of the concept of epistemic communities of researchers and government officials based around a particular issue such as cleaning up the Mediterranean Sea. This presaged the development beginning in the early 2000s of work on networks and how they can be both influential actors and governors. It paralleled and overlapped the explosion of work on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that began in the mid-1990s. At that time, I had a graduate student who did a literature review on NGOs and discovered there was little decent social science work on them; most of what could be found was written by activists. Other than the Keohane and Nye volume, the primary IO scholar to note the importance of NGOs prior to this had been Harold K. Jacobson in his textbook Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System. Two senior ACUNS members, Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss, edited the first book on the UN and NGOs in 1996. It was, however, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s landmark book Activists Beyond Borders (1998), coupled with the actual proliferation of NGOs and NGO activity in the 1990s, especially around UN-sponsored global conferences such as the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development and the fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, that truly stimulated and continue to inspire extensive and rich scholarship on NGOs. The issues of NGOs’ relationships with and access to international governmental organizations (IGOs) have been taken up more recently in the careful study by Jonas Tallberg et al. Charli Carpenter’s work on “lost causes” has countered the tendency for NGO literature to focus on cases of successful NGO advocacy.

In the early 2000s, a very different line of theorizing about international organizations drew on work in other social sciences to theorize about what was called the rational design of international institutions. At the same time, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore revived earlier thinking drawn from sociology, public administration, and organizational behavior
literatures about IOs as organizations by focusing on IOs as bureaucracies and on the behavior of secretariats. This approach enabled them (and subsequently others) to better understand the authority, power, goals, and behavior of IOs by getting inside the organizations. Small wonder, then, that their book has been highly influential in the field in the decade-plus since its publication. It was a logical step from that to Michael Barnett’s coedited volume with Raymond Duvall on Power in Global Governance, which includes Barnett and Finnemore’s chapter on “The Power of Liberal International Organizations” and other chapters that explore the power of particular governing arrangements, the effects on various actors, whose voice matters, and the legitimacy of various arrangements. This stream of IO work produced the important book Who Governs the Globe? edited by Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan Sell. It was the first major attempt to conceptualize the variety of actors in global governance as “governors”; to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing their efforts to govern various issue areas and policy arenas; and to incorporate consideration of governors’ authority, legitimacy, and accountability.

Focus on IO bureaucracies has also contributed to important recent work on leadership, including by UN Secretaries-General. This has included examination of IOs and their executive heads and bureaucracies as actors in international politics drawing on principal-agent (PA) theory.

Beginning in the mid-1990s and continuing to the present, there has been an important stream of work relating to the accountability and effectiveness of IOs as well as related work on states’ and other actors’ compliance with international law and norms. In recent years, this literature has burgeoned beyond general issues of accountability, effectiveness, and compliance to specific issue areas such as environmental performance at the World Bank, the accountability of humanitarian organizations, measuring progress in peacebuilding and state building, the efficacy of targeted sanctions, and accountability in generating governance indicators. Much of this work is of considerable value to practitioners as well as to scholars—the core of ACUNS’ mission.

The concept of global governance has also facilitated scholarly work since the late 1990s in two areas that are not specifically related to either IGOs or NGOs, namely, private authority and governance and the growth of public-private partnerships between IGOs, private foundations, corporations, and other entities. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, for example, has become central to funding global health activities. The UN Global Compact now links the UN with more than 8,000 multinational companies that have committed to enhancing corporate social responsibility. And agreement at the 2015 Paris conference on climate change was facilitated by public-private partnerships with twenty governments pledging to double spending on clean energy research and development and a coalition of business leaders pledging...
to invest billions in a green energy fund for clean energy start-ups. As Catia Gregoratti notes, “The universe of UN-business partnerships is vast and expanding.” Still to be determined, though, is whether these partnerships really produce the desired results: Do they truly improve corporate conduct through setting standards and principles of conduct?

Finally, in this brief survey of the state of the IO field, I note the proliferation of literatures in a wide variety of issue areas other than peace and security that long dominated the IO field. From environment, trade, finance, development, and human rights to renewed interest in international courts and the legalization trend, humanitarian intervention, human trafficking, migration, and global health, there is an ever-growing and rich body of work being done that demonstrates the breadth of the field. I further note the growth of literature on regionalism and regional organizations over the past twenty years, a literature that is rich in theory about the dynamics of regionalism and in studies of particular regions as well as some healthy cross-fertilization with the broader IO literature. It is particularly rich for the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Concerned, however, about what they describe as the “growing atomization” of the field of international relations (IR), Thomas Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson argue that focusing on broad issues of global governance has the potential to “rescue” the discipline of IR. Their point is that global governance is not just linked to the contemporary post–Cold War moment, but that it offers a set of questions about how the world is governed, ordered, and organized at different historical moments and about “how power is exercised across the globe, how a multiplicity of actors relate to one another generally as well as on specific issues, how to make better sense of global complexity, and how to account for alterations in the way that the world is and has been organized (or governed) over time.”

Various parts of the UN system and their activities have been studied in conjunction with this evolution of the IO field, representing a broad and rich revival of scholarly research on the UN, much of which has had at least the potential of being valuable to practitioners and of benefit to the UN itself. Among the projects specifically focusing on the UN and its contributions was the UN Intellectual History Project led by Thomas Weiss, Richard Jolly, and Louis Emmerij. Over the ten-year period between 1999 and 2009, the project produced sixteen books and seventy-nine oral histories that trace key ideas the UN spawned in its first fifty-five years, their development, impact, and the voices of personalities who played a role in their identification and implementation.

In summary, the IO field is vibrant and has developed in important ways over the past thirty years. ACUNS can take some credit for that, particularly to the degree that it has contributed to the rebirth and revitalization of the study of the UN and IOs through its workshops training new generations of
sicians and teachers, its dissertation fellowships, and its conferences providing an outlet for scholarly work and exchanges among scholars and practitioners. Before we congratulate ourselves too much, however, it is important to note where there are gaps and shortcomings.

**Gaps: Persistent and New**

First, where are the women? No, I am not referring to women scholars. There are many of us now. True, the UN is still falling short of its goals for improving the numbers and status of women especially at the senior levels. Rather, what is striking is the limited degree to which work on gender and feminist theory in other fields has penetrated the IO field. While there has been extensive work around the UN’s women, peace, and security agenda, on peacekeeping and Security Council Resolution 1325 as well as work on women in development, on UN efforts at gender mainstreaming, and on the success of the women’s movement in getting violence against women identified as a violation of women’s human rights, overall the IO field has not seen much application of feminist analysis or scholarly attention to Cynthia Enloe’s fundamental question: “Where are the women?”

More importantly, work is needed to address the question of what difference it makes to have more women in leadership positions within the UN and in global governance institutions more generally. It is not just a matter of whether there is a female Secretary-General, although the 2016 selection process certainly came a long way in pushing that agenda; nor is it just a question of achieving a set percentage of women in more senior posts in secretariats. We need empirical evidence of when and how, with regard to which issues, women’s presence in leadership positions makes a difference in policy outcomes and facts on the ground—a difference measured in reference to the UN Charter’s mandate or that of other institutions.

Second, where is the Global South? Here, yes, I am referring to the absence of work by scholars from the Global South. In the mid-1990s, Robert Cox led a United Nations University project on multilateralism and the UN system that included a number of scholars from the Global South and produced a series of nine books. Currently, Amitav Acharya has become a major figure in mainstream IR and IO literature, but he is one of a very few, having moved from his earlier focus on Southeast Asia and ASEAN to regionalism, constructivism, and global governance more generally. Ramesh Thakur is another who has written extensively on the UN, peace and security issues, and humanitarian intervention. To be sure, three of the current four editors of *Global Governance* are from the Global South and the journal devoted a special section of Volume 20, Issue 3, in 2014 to “Principles from the Periphery: The Neglected Southern Sources of Global Norms.” Only one of the five authors, however, was from the Global South.
As tends to be the case for IR, we in the Global North know little about the IO-, UN-, and global governance–related work and perspectives of those in the Global South. In introducing their volume *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver note, “The scholarly community has very little knowledge about how it is itself shaped by global and international relationships of power, knowledge, and resources . . . and how IR knowledge is shaped by the privileging of the core over the periphery and the formation of key concepts based solely on core perspectives.” This “provincialism of dominant perspectives”—notably the dominance of the North and especially of American scholarship—can be remedied only by more genuine interchanges among scholars and practitioners from both the Global North and the Global South. Moving ISA and ACUNS conferences to different parts of the world is an attempt to increase the intermingling of scholars from different regions, but the realities of the costs of travel and the tendency of many of us to network primarily with those we already know tend to limit the benefits. More concerted efforts are clearly needed.

Third, where is the attention to the links between domestic politics and what happens within the UN and other IOs to what might be called the “domestic sources of global governance”? Nearly thirty years ago, Robert Putnam published his widely cited and influential article, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games.” A number of studies of the United States and the UN, for example, have analyzed how domestic politics has shaped that relationship over time. In 1990, ACUNS convened a conference in Ottawa, Canada, on state policies in the UN system. Authors of papers for this conference were asked to include an analysis of societal factors shaping states’ UN policies. A volume on state/society perspectives on the UN system produced in the same time period under United Nations University auspices also incorporated examination of domestic structures and social forces in a different set of seven states, including four in the Global South. Also in the late 1990s, Etel Solingen’s book *Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn* examined the domestic and international coalitions that have shaped the nature of regional cooperation. It is striking, however, how little attention has been paid to the interaction between domestic factors and actors and global governance since then.

Several developments over the past year have drawn attention to the ways in which what happens within countries can impact international institutions and cooperation in fundamental ways. The referendum on Brexit in the UK has encouraged other opponents of further European integration and threatens fundamental changes in the EU. Rising populism, antipathy to globalization and trade agreements, nationalism, and xenophobia in many parts of the world pose serious threats to governments’ (particularly democratic governments’) ability and willingness to commit
themselves to international institutions—both IOs and international rules. The outcome of the 2016 presidential election in the United States and statements by President Donald Trump have raised serious doubts about a continuing US role in supporting the liberal international order that it helped create and sustain since the end of World War II. This includes continuing support for the UN system, the World Trade Organization–based trade system, the NATO alliance, alliances with Asia Pacific countries, and many other long-standing elements of US foreign policy. It also includes supporting global efforts to address climate change and humanitarian crises as well as promoting the rule of law, free trade, and human rights, albeit with the mixed messages that have long marked US commitments to multilateral rules and institutions. In short, these recent developments underscore how domestic politics matters for global governance.

Coupled with these domestic developments in various parts of the world are the significant shifts taking place in the global power balance. As Joseph Nye has argued for many years, the United States has been in relative, not absolute, decline. Yet it appears that 2016 may have been the year where perceptions of declining US power reached a tipping point, fueled by candidate Trump’s claims about US military power and failed policies as well as other countries’ perceptions of US weakness and failure to act in Syria and elsewhere. These developments have coincided with China’s rapid rise and willingness to take on major responsibilities such as UN peacekeeping, development funding through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and other initiatives, its assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, and its disregard of existing international law in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which it is a party as well as of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration’s ruling on its claims. Added to this is Russia’s greater assertiveness, particularly in Ukraine and the Syrian civil war, its challenges to the United States and NATO, and its interventions in the US and European elections. One among many indicators of the shifts in perceptions taking place is the theme of the 2017 Indian conference on global geopolitics (Raisina Dialogue): “The Search for a New Normal: Multilateralism or Multipolarity?”

All of these developments pose challenges for practitioners, policymakers, and scholars. Is the post–World War II liberal world order dead or dying? Is Richard Haass right in calling for a world order 2.0? The one thing that seems certain is that we are living in a dynamic period with high uncertainty about what the future holds and about what direction recent developments will take going forward.

As an American and a scholar of the UN, IOs more generally, and global governance, I worry that unless the United States continues to play a leading role in supporting and upholding the liberal world order it helped to create, that order will decay or even disintegrate over coming years with
serious consequences for the UN in particular. As Samuel Huntington noted many years ago, institutions decay far more easily than they can be developed. And whatever role the United States plays will be heavily determined by domestic politics. Clearly, the existing order is being challenged by China, Russia, and others who feel their interests can be better served by different rules (or none at all) and different institutions. And just as clearly, some institutional changes are needed to accommodate different needs and interests. Regarding the US role, I think it is worth noting that on a number of occasions since the late 1990s, middle powers and coalitions of smaller, weaker states and NGOs have pushed forward with various initiatives from climate change (Kyoto Protocol) and international criminal prosecution (ICC) to landmines and cluster munitions. The willingness to act even in the absence of US or other major power leadership has been strong, and that gives me hope for the future of the UN and global governance, as does the opposition to Trump administration policies that has been galvanized within the United States since day one of his presidency.

Given this dynamic international environment, I suggest to colleagues in the academic world, as well as to practitioners, that we need a new and broader framework for analyzing the consequences of shifts in global power balance, of domestic developments around the world, and of the variety of other factors that influence what happens within the UN, within other IOs, and in global governance more generally. In short, I suggest that these can be analyzed as “sources of global governance,” much as James Rosenau and others developed frameworks many years ago for analyzing the various types of factors influencing foreign policies. Such a framework for analyzing global governance can be portrayed graphically as a “funnel of causality” as shown in Figure 1.

The funnel’s broad opening captures the huge variety of issues, problems, events, and trends in the world that pose challenges and demands or needs for governance with a gradually narrowing range of factors that can influence the actual governance/IO policy or decisionmaking process(es) and, hence, the outputs from the UN, other IOs, NGOs, transnational policy networks, public-private partnerships, and private governors. These intervening levels of analysis include: (1) the global context that encompasses the distribution of power in a given issue area, the degree of interdependence, and existing norms, rules, and IOs; (2) coalitions of states, NGOs, and civil society groups as well as transnational networks and the degree of consensus, pressure for action, support, opposition for action, including the extent of media attention; (3) domestic supports for or opposition to international cooperation and governance within states or other actors; (4) within relevant IOs—whether NGOs or IOs—bureaucratic or secretariat initiatives to influence policies; (5) individual-level factors including the personalities, worldviews, positions, and role conceptions of
key individuals such as the UN Secretary-General, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the ICC prosecutor, or the director-general of the World Health Organization; and (6) the process(es) by which decisions are made—whether by a key official, within an executive council, or by an assembly of member states and whether by majority voting, consensus, or some other method. Finally, as in any decision process, it is important to take feedback loops into account, and particularly the possibilities of unexpected consequences that call for policy adjustments, as well as the degrees of implementation and compliance. In utilizing this framework, there is an opportunity to draw from a variety of literatures, data, and on-the-ground experience.
The Challenges Going Forward

Despite the many uncertainties we face today, we do know that one of the challenges going forward is how to meet the unprecedented needs for international cooperation and global governance. The title of a recent book edited by Amitav Acharya asks, Why Govern? From the 60 million or more people on the move as refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants, to the threat of famine and large-scale humanitarian crisis in large parts of Africa to the growing evidence of climate change, the decline of respect for human rights in many parts of the world, the persistence of acute poverty, increasing economic inequality, terrorism, and the dilemma of how to deal with North Korea, there is a daunting array of issues facing the international community and its titular leader UN Secretary-General António Guterres. If Lyons, Boulding, and other ACUNS founders thought the demands on the UN were growing in the mid-1980s and needed greater attention by scholars as well as more interactions between scholars and practitioners, there is little doubt that the challenge and need are even greater today.

I close my remarks by noting that seventy-two years after my father and others at the San Francisco conference expressed great hope for the new organization’s future, the United Nations as the central institution of global governance in the post–World World II liberal order faces unprecedented need for action and global cooperation to cope with wars, famines, poverty, and climate change along with the uncertainty of how much support it will receive going forward from one of its most important members—the United States. It also faces the need for major reform if it is to avoid becoming irrelevant. This is truly a pivotal moment for the UN and its future.

I also note that thirty years after the founding of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, ACUNS faces the challenge of how best to pursue its mission of supporting both research and practice relating to the UN system and global governance. ACUNS could play a more proactive role, for example, in encouraging interchanges between scholars and practitioners as well as between those of us in the Global North and colleagues in the Global South so that our studies of the UN system and global governance reflect less the dominance of Northern perspectives and more a blend of North and South. I suggest to scholars and practitioners the need to think more seriously about how to deal with the decline or disintegration of IOs and with changes in global governance arrangements that result from domestic shifts within major powers, the emergence of new power centers and actors, and unanticipated crises. We are, indeed, at a pivotal moment in global governance and for the study of IOs and global governance, one where I hope that looking back will also help us to look forward.

When faced with uncertainty and changes such as we see in the world today, there inevitably is a tendency in some quarters to prognosticate that
the outcome will be a return to bad patterns of the past—greater violence, more human suffering, heightened nationalism and protectionism, less respect for human rights and searches for justice, and more environmental disasters. It is not hard to envision such a dark future. Yet it is also possible to see where human creativity, entrepreneurship, leadership, and dedication can and have produced enormous improvements in the human condition and in our collective ability to solve problems and govern ourselves. It is in that spirit that I challenge all of us to play whatever part we can—as scholars, practitioners, and citizens of the world as well as of our respective countries—in making that better future possible.

Notes

5. Ibid., p. 19.
9. On regime complexes, see the several articles in Global Governance 19, no. 1 (January–March 2013); on orchestration, see Christer Jönsson, “The John Holmes


47. Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn*.
49. I thank Ramesh Thakur for calling this conference and its theme to my attention.