John Holmes Memorial Lecture at the 2016 ACUNS Annual Meeting

Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari

Security and Justice at a Crossroads: The Future of Global Governance

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the publication of
"Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance",
The Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance

June 17, 2016 (2:00 – 3:30 pm)

EXTENDED VERSION FOR CIRCULATION

I.   Introduction

Thank you Professor (Anjali) Dayal for your kind and generous introduction, and please let me also recognize and extend my appreciation to Professor Lorraine Elliott and the members of the ACUNS Board, Professor Alistair Edgar, the members of the ACUNS Secretariat and 2016 Annual Meeting organizing team, my good friend Professor Brendan Cahill and his colleagues here at beautiful Fordham University, my son's alma mater, and to all of you, the participants of this year's Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System.

Professor Dayal's introduction reminded me of how I was once described in the UN corridors as Ibrahim Gambari, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in places where no one else wished to serve … or worse yet, the UN Envoy to world dictators. Yet someone must speak for those who have no other voice in the countries where the UN seeks to promote peace, democracy, and human rights. In our increasingly fractious and fractured world, that is the much needed role of the United Nations.

It is a great honor to deliver this year's John Holmes Memorial Lecture on the topic "Security and Justice at a Crossroads: The Future of Global Governance". When I looked into the remarkable history of the remarkable man who was John Holmes, I quickly learned that through his distinguished career as a diplomat and scholar, he personified many of the themes and issues I intend to underscore which sit at the intersection of security and justice in global governance. Some of you here from Canada may have been trained by Professor Holmes and perhaps are well aware of his commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts, to global justice, and to shaping Canadian foreign policy in order to make a difference in the world.

I am grateful for the opportunity to deliver this lecture when the over-arching theme of this year's Annual Meeting is "Meeting the Challenges of Development and Dignity." 2015 was a watershed year for the United Nations, first with the adoption of seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal Sixteen on peaceful societies, access to

justice, and inclusive governance. And 2015 ended with the equally historic Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the objectives of which must be pursued, and with ever increasing vigor, if we wish to save the world as we know it.

In these two agreements, humankind has set for itself an ambitious set of global goals. Meeting them, while dealing with other pressing issues from building peace to strengthening global institutions and better managing the interconnected global economy, is a moral and practical imperative of our community of nations. Fortunately, a wide range of leaders and thinkers, scholars and practitioners, working as Commissions on conflict, justice, governance, climate change, and the UN's long-term future—with their many thoughtful recommendations—have already painted the stripes for us on the highway to the future.

II.   The Intersection of Security & Justice in Global Governance: Just Security

As noted in Professor Dayal's introduction, I was honored to serve as co-chair, alongside Secretary Madeleine Albright, of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, a project of The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center. Yesterday marked the one-year anniversary of the launch of the Commission's Report, *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*, at the Peace Palace in The Hague. Many of you participated, I understand, in a "pre-launch event" just preceding the last ACUNS Annual Meeting, at The Hague Institute. One year later, I wish to speak to the context for that Report, highlight a few of its most pertinent recommendations, and assess how far we have come to advancing some of them.

In terms of global and historical context: despite two World Wars and untold human suffering, humanity witnessed an unparalleled advance of freedom and justice in the 20th century with the defeat of fascism and the demise of other forms of totalitarian government. In the past two decades, the world has also managed to reduce extreme global poverty by half, and to harness a range of new technologies in agriculture, communications, transport and health, the sum total of which makes our interconnected global economy possible but also feeds our global woes.

Militant extremism continues to take root in poorly governed spaces, where state institutions and the rule of law have collapsed. Violence and extremism not only express themselves within poorly governed spaces, but its effects are felt all over the world, including Paris, Brussels, and most recently Orlando. According to the latest annual Global Peace Index, terrorism is at an all-time high, battle deaths—fueled, in particular, by conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa—are at a 25 year high, and the number of refugees and displaced people are at a level not seen in 60 years. Moreover, grave human rights violations and discrimination against women, children, and minorities continue unabated worldwide. Humanity's unplanned impact on global climate—the backdrop to all other human achievement—and the rise of new technologies offering global connectivity, but equally global risks, remind us daily of the need to diminish that

impact and better manage those risks. But ad hoc groups of states—*coalitions of the fleeting*—cannot reach those ends, and our current global institutions have neither the power nor the resilience to do so either.

We can choose to manage our global affairs, in the face of such challenge and risk in a manner that lends itself to greater peace, fairness, and equal opportunities for all nations and their citizens, or allow our global governance structures and mechanisms to decay further and fail to match the scale and complexity of present day challenges and threats.

Embracing the former path, members of the Commission have advocated, over the past twelve months, for the creation of better tools, institutions, norms, and networks at the global level to avoid catastrophe, whether that takes the form of increasing armed conflicts, more violent floods and storms, or the kinds of market failures witnessed during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. There is a great need for new kinds of public, private, and mixed approaches to global governance that are designed for twenty-first-century challenges and threats.

Worries from the West and the International Community

In addition to these broad trends, there are three, what I wish to term as "Worries from the West and the International Community" that have grown more acute over the past year, potentially crippling efforts to revitalize our struggling system of global governance:

- *First and foremost*, the Rise of Nativism. For several years now, the pernicious combination of sluggish economies, persistent unemployment, refugee and migration flows, and terrorism have increased the ranks of far-right parties in large parts of Europe and emboldened exclusionary policies. Now, to the surprise of many, similar sentiments appear dominant in one of America's two largest political parties, and threaten to tear asunder the European Union with a real possibility of the United Kingdom deciding to leave in next week's referendum.

- *A second* worry, where action especially from the West is vital, is overcoming the perceived Global Representative Governance Deficit, whereby global and regional powers with growing economies and political clout feel both under-represented and unjustly treated in major global institutions from the UN Security Council to the Bretton Woods institutions. A failure to correct this imbalance within the changing international order, as we are beginning to see with the BRICS and in Asia, may engender "Worries from the East", whereby the UN and other global institutions are challenged by the rise of new, parallel institutions that may also be indifferent to established global norms.

- *A third* major concern is the observed reluctance of many mainstream Western leaders to equip global institutions effectively to safeguard and advance global norms, from human rights and inclusive, democratic forms of governance to the

more recent "responsibility to protect". Remarkably, when Western governments opt to champion such norms through smaller Western-dominated coalitions or institutions, they fail to recognize that this can, in fact, de-legitimize and undermine otherwise well-intentioned efforts.

Just Security: A new lens for understanding and responding to global challenges

Before coming to the types of substantial changes that are urgently needed in our international architecture to achieve a more just and secure world, and ideas on a strategy for reform, I wish to say a few words to this audience primarily of scholars about the analytical lenses our Commission used to better understand and respond to today's global challenges and threats.

The concept of global **security** has evolved from the absence of war between major powers to include intra-state conflicts with regional and global implications, as the wars in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan expose. After the Cold War, peacekeepers were sent first to implement peace agreements, then to support humanitarian action during conflict, and most recently to protect civilians and even to suppress residual conflict.

Security's counterpart, **justice**, has several dimensions, from the retributive justice of formal law enforcement and post-war restorative justice, to notions of global distributive justice, anchored in the work of John Rawls, and other political philosophers who take Rawls's ideas on liberty and fairness global. Similarly, it is useful to extend from a national to a global context Martin Luther King's famous maxim, "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."

After the Second World War, the notion of justice emerged more resolutely in deliberations at the global level with the UN Charter, a result of the insight that to truly "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," collective or common security alone is not enough; global justice—the effective pursuit of "larger freedom" on a global scale—was recognized as equally important.

Indeed, security and justice are both needed if humanity is to not only survive but thrive with dignity. Their fusion and the condition of their joint fulfillment we on the Commission have called "just security."

The growing connectivity between security and justice in global affairs exhibits both short-term trade-offs and tensions but can also reveal ways in which they are mutually reinforcing. For instance, security can lend urgency and fresh perspectives to long-standing climate justice concerns.

The complete scope of **governance** encompasses informal or consensual arrangements for managing aspects of human relationships, from local and customary justice to the Montreal Protocol on global atmospheric ozone and the new Paris Climate Agreement. In today's interdependent world, global governance is networked governance, and its

objectives are global public goods—which anyone can benefit from without diminishing their availability to others, and which no one can be excluded from using. *Just security* aims to forge a mutually supportive global system of accountable, fair, and effective governance and durable peace.

At national, regional, and global levels, uncertain, weak, and corrupt governance has time and again been a gateway to insecurity and injustice. Without effective governance that is just, security nor can be assured. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu writes, "Where justice and order are not restored, there can be no healing, leaving violence and hatred ticking like a bomb in the corner", or as Pope Paul VI famously proclaimed, "If you want peace, work for justice."

Security, justice, and governance are, hence, inextricably linked; the twin pursuit of security and justice, or *just security*, is, therefore, an essential element of any new enterprise setting out to reform the global governance architecture. It is a subject that The Hague Institute and the Stimson Center will delve into in further detail together when they bring out next year the Commission report's companion edited volume, *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*, through Oxford University Press.

III.   Global Governance Reform Challenges and Progress at the Intersection of Security and Justice

Applying the framework of just security, the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance concluded that today's global challenges, from mass violence in fragile states, such as Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic, and runaway climate change to fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber-attacks, require new kinds of global tools, institutions, norms, and networks if they are to be effectively managed. Climate change, economic shocks, and cyber-attacks are likely to have lasting and far-reaching consequences, and the marked and visible increase in mass atrocities in one country after another has reversed the trend of declining political violence that began with the end of the Cold War.

In response to these global policy challenges examined in its report, the Commission made some eighty-five distinct, yet inter-related global governance reform recommendations toward achieving a more just and secure world. I wish to highlight a few illustrative examples and to underscore how certain proposals hold deep personal meaning for me in connection with my years of service at the United Nations.

Major Illustrative Reform Ideas from the Commission's Report

Perhaps the issues and reform ideas closest to my heart fall under the heading of "Coping with Violent Conflict & State Fragility", a subject on which I believe we further pushed the boundaries in an Experts Dialogue yesterday at the United Nations.

Formal global responses to managing and addressing the sources of deadly conflict remain fairly anemic compared to investments in conventional military power. The UN deploys the great majority of global peace operations, but its efforts equal no more than ½ of 1 percent of world military expenditure.

Peace processes still have a gender bias, with usually male leaders of contending armed forces and groups meeting with mostly male mediators or facilitators. Women's experiences and concerns are not adequately represented.

We propose that the UN establish—as part of a new standing **Civilian Response Capability**—a **professional cadre of mediators and mission leadership** and that a concerted effort be made to **recruit and appoint women to senior mediation and leadership roles.** We further argue for **greater participation by women from conflict-affected states, at decision-making levels,** in processes of peacemaking and peace implementation.

Moreover, if the **Responsibility to Protect and its corollary responsibilities to prevent and rebuild** are to be more than declaratory principles, proponents of these principles need to better define the implications of each, and to address the political, as well as functional, obstacles to making them operational. For example, when I led the hybrid UN-African Union Mission in Darfur—the largest UN peace operation at the time with 30,000 peacekeepers and an annual budget of about $2 billion—I was surprised and dismayed when I learned that I could allocate only $4 million to Quick Impact Projects (QUIPS) capable of creating jobs and dealing better with the critical issue of adequate water supply and fairer water management, and thereby enabling my mission to better address the root causes of the conflict of war-torn western Sudan.

A second illustrative set of proposals are designed to innovate the present **model of climate governance**. Climate change is a quintessential global governance challenge, with far-reaching effects beyond the abilities of any single state or small grouping of states to contain or redress. In seeking to strengthen the connections between grassroots action and top-down approaches to mitigate and adapt to the worst effects of climate change, the Commission called for, among other measures:

• **Opening future intergovernmental climate agreements so that actors other than national governments can publicly commit to them**, including, for example, provincial and district leaders, mayors, industry and professional associations, and civil society organizations, including women's organizations.

• **Requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice** (initiated through the U.N. General Assembly) on states' obligation to mitigate climate change through domestic measures, thereby strengthening the legal basis for climate action. And:

• **Creating a Green Technology Licensing Facility** (within the Green Climate Fund) to help those least able to cope to adapt to climate change, by better leveraging private sector ingenuity and boosting the transfer of environmentally sound technologies.

The Commission also addressed the architecture of global governance at large. One example that I wish to stress here, that we believe is achievable within the next five years, is the creation of a **United Nations Parliamentary Network**. Public access to and participation in the workings of the UN remain far too limited. Established as an advisory body to the General Assembly under Article 22 of the Charter, the UN Parliamentary Network would bring together parliamentarians elected from their national legislatures, creating a new platform for input and accountability claims by citizens and civil society groups.

For further details on these and many other global governance reform proposals, I encourage you to consult the Commission's report and to debate and challenge its ideas.

An Abridged Review of Progress One Year After the Commission Report Launch

So, what progress have we seen since our report was made public one year ago in The Hague and in a series of subsequent launch events around the world, including New York, Abuja, New Delhi, and Tokyo? Let me begin by noting—and this will be no surprise to this seasoned group of UN scholars and practitioners before me—that it is difficult to gauge just yet where specific Commission recommendation have garnered political traction in Turtle Bay or in the corridors of power in major capitals. But our Commission shared a point of view and a number of ideas with reviews underway at the same time as ours, on UN peace operations, on the UN's peacebuilding architecture, and on women, peace and security, on which there have been a few positive examples of progress that I wish to highlight.

- *First*, responding directly to last year's review of the Peacebuilding Architecture and Global Study on Women, Peace, and Security, the recent UN resolutions on both issue areas represent a renewed commitment to current UN peacebuilding capabilities and to addressing sexual exploitation in peace operations. The Secretary-General stated in April that some 90 percent of the actions proposed by last year's peace operations review were at some stage of implementation.

  These are positive foundations that the somewhat more ambitious reform proposals found in the report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance can build upon, including in its proposal to upgrade the Peacebuilding Commission into a Council with new authorities in the areas of coordination, financing, and prevention.

- *Second*, as last December's Paris Agreement on climate change shows, world leaders, in partnership with thousands of stakeholder groups from across civil society, the business community, and sub-national governing entities, are ready to begin taking the extraordinary and decisive action required to address the causes and impact of climate change. Though the new model of climate governance advocated by the Commission is far from complete, the parallel voluntary commitments to action by civil society, business, and municipal representatives

that go beyond the measures that national governments are willing to undertake at present signals that we are on the right track. And the related Commission recommendation to establish a Climate Action Clearinghouse was adopted by governments.

Since many scientists continue to warn that the nationally determined commitments under the Paris Agreement are still not enough to prevent devastating climate change, further efforts to innovate climate governance are needed urgently. Indeed, mitigating and adapting to climate change globally require a new understanding of what constitutes security and justice in the twenty-first century.

- *A Third* example of progress is the adoption by the Pan-African Parliament of the African Union, only last month, of a strong resolution calling on all African Governments to take action at the United Nations in support of a UN Parliamentary Assembly, which is already endorsed by some 1,500 current and former parliamentarians, including a recent reconfirmation by the EU's foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini. I am pleased to also share here that one of our Commissioners, former Dutch foreign minister and Mayor of The Hague Jozias van Aartsen, will convene, with Professor Benjamin Barber and several hundred Mayors from around the world, the first Global Parliament of Mayors this September in The Hague. This initiative too, which intends to consult the UN regularly, is consistent with the Commission's efforts to work toward a more inclusive and accountable system of global governance.

- *A Final* area manifesting tangible progress in the past twelve months, that was also underscored yesterday during the ACUNS Annual Meeting, concerns improvements in the selection procedure for the next Secretary-General. Starting with last September's General Assembly resolution and followed shortly by a joint letter in December from the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council, many of the ideas of the civil society-driven *1 for 7 Billion Campaign*, endorsed by the Commission, are being implemented, including a clear timetable for selection, a formal list of selection criteria, and perhaps most importantly, engaging more than only Security Council member countries in the vetting process. Efforts to at least seriously discuss a single, seven-year term for the Secretary-General, or to have the Council recommend more than one candidate to the General Assembly, however, have not borne fruit to date.

To generate momentum for these and related independent and official reform initiatives, I dedicate the final part of my lecture to outlining key elements of a Strategy for Reform.

IV.   Strategy for Reform: Towards a World Summit on Global Security, Justice & Governance in 2020 (UN 75)

The world approaches a critical crossroads: both global security and justice face severe, in some areas unprecedented, threats and challenges. At the same time, combining technological advance with a growing global consciousness, the opportunities abound for promoting global peace, cooperation, and increased choices for human betterment. This requires bold yet realistic global institutional innovations and new networks, norms, and tools, particularly in the near-term. In this regard, the scholars and practitioners in this hall are no doubt familiar with many of the reform proposals touched upon in my remarks and inspired by countless commissions, high-level panels, and, indeed, the writings of many in the ACUNS community.

Nonetheless, a still relatively under-developed area of scholarship meriting your attention, and one to which I intend to dedicate the remainder of my lecture, deals with strategies and approaches for *how* global governance reform and innovation is actually achieved: *how* to "get from here to there". To be successful, these strategies and approaches must comprehend and overcome the three chief impediments to global systemic change:

- *First*, a lack of political will to change, particularly among powerful countries mired in narrow definitions of "national interest" and senior international civil servants capable of obstruction.
- *Second*, failure to effectively design and advocate a specific policy or institutional reform.
- And *third*, limited skill and effort invested in sustaining a reform program through completion.

A "3 + 2" Strategy

Key elements of an effective way to approach global governance reform can be represented in what I describe as a "3 + 2" Strategy: Three critical sets of actors and two major reform vehicles for channeling actors' ideas and political support toward achievable, yet transformative goals.

The *first* major set of actors, **UN Member States**, remains the bedrock of the international system, despite, as noted earlier, the diffusion of power from states in recent decades to sub-national and non-state entities. Since many of the reform ideas envisaged strike at the heart of distinctly intergovernmental bodies and the very notion of "state sovereignty," the buy-in, or at the least agreement of states to not block progress, is fundamental to achieving global systemic reform. Recent history shows that both sector-specific and more comprehensive reform efforts depend on leadership from a few champion countries, from both the Global North and South. This was the case with many significant initiatives in the late '90s and early '2000s, including on landmines, child

soldiers, and issues of Women, Peace & Security, through the Human Security Network. Perhaps the time has now come to inaugurate a similar kind of "Just Security Network" of select countries to champion progressive changes in our global system of governance?

The *second* set of actors, **global civil society**, encompasses non-governmental organizations, social and religious movements, community-based groups, the business community, scholars, and journalists. From the Coalition for the International Criminal Court and Jubilee 2000 Campaign to the Compact of States and Regions and their growing influence on matters of climate governance, substantive change in global governance rarely occurs without the active engagement of a diverse range of non-state actors. In building a new kind of "smart coalition" of like-minded states and non-state actors to drive reform, my Commission has called for standing up a "Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Reform."

This Global Platform idea represents a "multistakeholder" approach to global governance reform and innovation, intended to fully harness the capabilities and ingenuity of its varied members. A series of Track 1.5 policy dialogues, anchored around thematic priorities identified by the Commission, could help to deepen the focus of global reform advocates on select, achievable goals, while at the same time establishing an informal mechanism for sustained and concerted action on behalf of those goals.

Another, complementary, idea is to convene Global Town Hall meetings to further broaden the network and engage grassroots organizations and individual activists in future conversations about the governance of our increasingly interdependent planet.

The *third and final set* of actors is **international civil servants,** including especially the leadership of the **UN Secretary-General**. He or she wields many tools and may choose among many potential courses of action to exert influence. When applied with courage, creativity, and political acumen, Secretaries-General become protagonists for global governance reform, alongside governments and non-governmental actors.

Channeling the ideas and the political support of these three sets of actors toward achievable, yet transformative goals is the objective of the two proposed vehicles for reform. The *first vehicle*, what the Commission called "**Reform Through Parallel Tracks,**" acknowledges that different kind of multilateral reform ideas will require different kinds of multilateral negotiating forums and will proceed at different speeds. For example, specific UN task forces in New York—composed, for example, of a select group of Permanent Representatives from all major regions and co-chaired by PRs from the Global North and South—could deliberate on creating new or reforming existing bodies, such as a UN Parliamentary Network to advise the UN General Assembly or upgrading the UN Peacebuilding Commission into a Council, prior to final negotiation in the UN General Assembly or Security Council. And as I learned in creating the UN Mediation Support Unit as Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, innovation can be introduced rapidly when a few forward-leaning Member States, the Secretary-General, and non-governmental partners come together in common cause, with uncommon funding.

Some advantages of such an approach would be to facilitate the sequencing of reform priorities based on criteria such as urgency, political feasibility, and cost, without getting bogged down in a potentially over-ambitious reform agenda. At the same time, focusing only on specific institutional or other changes may limit opportunities to exploit linkages between issues and actors across what needs to be a better integrated system of governance, given both the tensions and potential complementarities between, for example, peace, development, and the environment. Moreover, narrowly defined reform agendas reduce chances for "give-and-take" among negotiators and can be more easily subverted by one or two powerful opponents.

A *second reform vehicle*, and one which I believe has the potential to capture the imagination of world leaders and millions of citizens worldwide, is to organize in the run-up to the United Nations' 75th anniversary a series of formal intergovernmental, yet at the same time multistakeholder, negotiations leading to the convening, in September 2020, of a heads of state and government-level **World Summit on Global Security, Justice & Governance**— ideally, as part of the traditional UN Summit planned to mark important anniversaries. The 2020 Summit is expected to include a five-year review of progress toward meeting the Sustainable Development Goals. A World Summit has the potential to take a step back and contemplate the international system and its institutions, anchored around the United Nations, as a whole and to adopt system-wide reforms that seek greater coherence, reduce waste and duplication of effort, and encourage mutually reinforcing linkages between several, interdependent issue areas, including global governance for improved implementation of the SDGs.

One possible model for inspiration could be the 1987 Brundtland Commission, which, through its landmark report *Our Common Future*, called for what became the 1990-1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development Conference process with four 4-week Preparatory Committee meetings, culminating in the June 1992 Rio Earth Summit. The Summit resulted in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Biodiversity and Desertification Conventions, and the Agenda 21 sustainable development action plan, which continue to have a lasting impact today.

Some advantages of the World Summit on Global Security, Justice & Governance approach is that such a conference could serve as a defined rallying point for smart coalitions of like-minded state and non-state actors and generate political momentum for multiple, urgent global reform initiatives. It could also facilitate strong negotiation outcomes through deal-making across a broad reform agenda that speaks to diverse interests and outlooks. Conversely, a World Summit that includes highly contentious reform issues, such as the expansion of the Security Council and curbing of the veto power of its permanent members, may divert international attention away from equally significant, but perhaps more politically feasible global governance reforms.

V.   Conclusion: The Future of Global Security, Justice & Governance

In concluding this John Holmes Memorial Lecture, I wish to impart four final thoughts on the future of Global Security, Justice & Governance:

First, we are fortunate that we do not have to artificially choose between a specific avenue or strategy to achieve meaningful and lasting global governance reforms that safeguard and promote global security and justice. Rather, my fellow Commissioners have recommended a "hybrid approach", whereby the strengths of both sector or institution-specific approaches, on one hand, and a more comprehensive World Summit approach are kept purposely open. This practical way forward in facilitating multilateral negotiations and sequencing reforms, we believe, offers the higher potential for success in advancing a complex set of systemic global governance reforms.

Second, as my decades-long career in multilateral diplomacy and scholarship has taught me, neither of these two recommended strategies stand to take root without the collective, full, and sustained engagement of the major constellation of global actors that I outlined earlier, namely UN Member States, international civil servants, and global civil society or what the scholars Thomas Weiss, Tatianna Carayannis, and Richard Jolly have aptly called "The Third United Nations". When their respective ideas, resources, and networks are leveraged effectively together in a true spirit of partnership, progressive and durable global change can be achieved.

A *third*, and closely related point is that while I focused mainly today on urgent, and what I view as fully realistic reform proposals in the run-up to the UN's 75th anniversary in 2020, a strong case can be made that we should remain committed to imagining, studying, and advancing even more far-reaching global governance reform innovations that can require several more years, if not decades, to build sufficient political traction and to eventually materialize. Rather than to steep themselves in conceptual constraints oft-imposed by theoretical constructs from the 20th century or bow to present-day political exigencies, scholars, in particular, have the privilege, if not duty, to contribute to normative, long-term visioning exercises rooted in robust analysis yet dedicated to innovating the tools, institutions, norms, and networks integral to effective 21st century global governance. Because when humanity—only a generation from now in 2045—will approach the *centennial* of the founding of the United Nations, it should be an occasion of pride, celebration, and hope; and not a retrospective on a magnificent idea that was squandered.

Finally, achieving a future rooted in progressive norms and values associated with global justice and security and their mutually reinforcing interplay, or "just security", also depends on a new kind of leadership underpinned by a global civic ethic. Garnering political support and seeing through to fulfillment a robust vision of *just security* requires leaders who are ready and willing to adopt a far-sighted strategy that gives equal weight to and pursues both global security and justice goals simultaneously, when working to overcome obstacles and seize new opportunities for the benefit of all people.

As my fellow co-chair, Secretary Madeleine Albright, stressed at our Commission report launch last July at the United Nations:

Without effective and inclusive global governance that also safeguards fundamental human rights, the hard-fought gains of earlier generations may be lost and the extraordinary potential of future generations jeopardized. Repeated failures to achieve reform within the UN and other entities deepen the global governance crisis with serious implications for security and justice.

As scholars and practitioners of multilateral diplomacy, we must conspire to persuade those in official positions of power about the urgency of moving from a competitive zero-sum or lowest common denominator framework to more collaborative negotiations, where a better balance is struck between local, national, regional, and global interests. Powerful states and other increasingly influential global actors have a special responsibility to work toward a shared analysis of global problems, such as climate change and the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and to seize opportunities to remedy them.

In seeking to forge a mutually supportive system of good, accountable governance and sustainable peace globally through the intersection of security and justice, *just security* offers a unique prism for informing a new generation of policy-makers and scholars seeking to understand and better respond to some of the most pressing global concerns of our time. In employing this framework in our analysis and decision-making, the international community can face today's metaphorical crossroads for global security and justice and boldly embark on a course toward greater peace, fairness, and equal opportunities for all nations and their citizens, now and for generations to come.

Thank you.