THE GLOBAL FORUM

The John Holmes Memorial Lecture:
Representing the United Nations—Individual
Actors, International Agency, and Leadership

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The first major biography of John W. Holmes carries the emblematic title Canada’s Voice: The Public Life of John Wendell Holmes. The title implies that here we have an example of one individual speaking for and shaping the voice of a whole nation, embodying the values and principles of Canadian foreign policy. This is, of course, a suitable title for a biography that by its very nature underlines the significance of the person portrayed. It may, however, also illustrate that we quite commonly refer to the fact that it is concrete individuals that represent abstract institutions or ideas. It is also customary for political institutions to regulate specifically who will speak on behalf of the respective entity—be it heads of state and government or executive heads of international organizations. In a static understanding of the term, representation is closely tied to questions of law and protocol defining the situations and responsibilities that are tied to the execution of political offices. But going beyond this understanding of the term for established routines and hierarchies, a dynamic understanding of the term may see it as a crucial ingredient in the growth and development of a given institution or the idea behind that institution.

It is in this context that I discuss a special type of actor in the United Nations system that has not received the amount of attention in academic and political circles that it deserves: special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs). The argument that I present starts with a reflection on what it means to represent an international organization. Then, I analyze how the representatives of the Secretary-General have developed as a specific type of individual actor. Looking both at their origin as well as their development over time, I argue that the actions of these individual actors account for a special kind of agency of the organization that they represent. The question of how individual actions translate into international agency inevitably leads to a discussion of leadership, which I would like to introduce and illustrate as a constitutive feature of that process.
SRSGs are persons appointed by the Secretary-General to fulfill various roles from peacemaking to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. They work in specific conflict situations or are engaged in transregional and thematic issues, with activities ranging from discreet mediation efforts to conducting a peace operation and, as in the case of Kosovo, virtually running a country. Since 1990, their number and the tasks they have been entrusted with have increased dramatically. The current website of the Secretary-General lists about seventy names. The acronym SRSG is used for a broader category comprising a wide variety of high-level appointments. Mirroring different tasks, contexts, and mandates, it includes, for example, special envoys, heads of mission, special advisers, personal representatives, and transitional administrators. Twenty years ago, Donald J. Puchala (coincidentally another Holmes Lecturer), in one of the few articles dealing with the phenomenon, argued that “even some very elementary questions” regarding their origin, development, functions, and performance “remain unanswered.” Some twenty years later Puchala’s assessment holds true, although a few articles and reports explicitly dealing with SRSGs have been published. The work of Connie Peck especially must be mentioned since she not only wrote several pieces on the SRSGs, but also compiled material from a series of interviews with SRSGs for the UN Institute for Training and Research in an attempt to facilitate training of SRSGs.

With various tasks in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, three main subgroups of SRSGs emerge from the titles used: representatives, envoys, and advisers. Although the labels are not the result of strict procedure and originate from such diverse rationales as tradition, preference of the officeholder, and, last but not least, preference of the country to which they are deployed, a rough distinction can be made. Representatives usually have peacekeeping tasks, envoys are more or less focused on peacemaking duties, and advisers normally work on cross-cutting and transnational issues out of headquarters: “These SRSGs [i.e., advisers] are assigned to raise awareness of . . . major problems, to develop relevant policy, and to work with member states and the UN system to ensure that the problems receive appropriate attention and action.” Examples include the current special adviser on post-2015 development planning, but also the special envoys on climate change and the special representative for migration. So, the distinction by title is far from precise. Talk of SRSGs as a category of actors implies that the concrete appointment or mandate can in fact have what the former head of the Department of Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, called “a bewildering variety” of titles. A rough functional distinction that can be made is the one between conflict-related SRSGs usually with country-specific tasks deployed in the field and thematic SRSGs with transregional tasks often working from headquarters. SRSGs usually hold the rank of under-secretary-general for the duration of their mission, which gives them further standing. With the aim of building more coherent and integrated peace missions, SRSGs in the field were also
given special status, as Kofi Annan’s “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions” in 2006 states. According to this note, the SRSG is “the senior UN Representative in the country and has overall authority over the activities of the UN.” But the note goes on to explicitly state: “He/She represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the UN in a given country.”

**Representation**

Representation is a crucial element of international relations in general and diplomacy in particular since the beginning of transactions across borders involved the practice of dispatching envoys, representatives, and mediators from one actor to another. While the rank of ambassador is usually bestowed on the national representative of one country in a different country, new methods of diplomatic interaction, such as the emergence of international organizations, have led to new diplomatic titles. As Paul Sharp argues, representation is “a human condition that precedes and transcends the experience of living in the sovereign, territorial states of the past few hundred years.” The term may therefore also apply to the work of representatives of international organizations to the extent that they, too, represent and implement efforts for cooperation, the management of common problems, and the construction of order. In that context, representatives of international organizations are asked to represent not one country with its particular values and interests, but rather—in the case of the UN at least—an organization with universal values and principles. Article 100 of the UN Charter speaks in this context of the “exclusively international character” of the work of Secretariat members. The Secretary-General as their chief administrative officer is then also the principal representative of the organization and is widely seen as the embodiment and personification of its values and principles. Serving in this capacity, the Secretary-General, for rather practical reasons, introduced the practice of appointing representatives that could help in the exercise of the office and work as representatives of the chief representative.

Among the first officials endowed with the title of representative was Wlodzimierz Moderow of Poland, the first director of the UN office in Geneva. He was additionally designated “Representative of the Secretary-General in Geneva” in 1946 in order to negotiate and organize with the League of Nations’ last secretary-general, Sean Lester, the transfer of assets from the League. The reasoning behind Moderow’s appointment is quite simple and plausible: the first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, needed someone who could speak for him to negotiate and arrange matters on an equal footing with the League’s secretary-general. Since the UN Secretary-General could not spend a long time away from headquarters to deal with technical problems in the context of the League’s dissolution, Moderow’s task was to represent him in the legal procedures. So, this would be a prag-
matic functionalist understanding of representation and this understanding is the background for two more of the first appointments. Lie also appointed, and in fact double-hatted, Victor Hoo, his assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Trusteeship, as personal representative of the Secretary-General on the UN Special Committee on Palestine in 1946—because he could not attend all meetings of the committee but wanted to be kept informed. And in 1947 Lie sent Erik Colban, former member of the Norwegian delegation to the UN, to be the Secretary-General’s personal representative to the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.

Starting in the same vein, but then taking on a quite different nature, was Lie’s appointment in 1948 of Ralph Bunche (who served as director in the department of trusteeship) as representative of the Secretary-General in Palestine where he was supposed to support the mission of Count Folke Bernadotte as UN mediator. The type of mission that Bernadotte undertook is in fact compatible with what conflict-related SRSGs do today. Bernadotte’s mandate, however, was created by the General Assembly, which installed a particular committee to choose a suitable personality. The members of that committee were the permanent members of the Security Council. Bernadotte, although his name was suggested to the committee by Lie, therefore was not a representative of the Secretary-General and his appointment shows the strong influence that member states exercised when such special mandates were created at the beginning of the UN. Bunche was directly appointed by Lie to support Bernadotte and keep the Secretary-General au courant. These clearly distinguished roles of a leading mediator appointed by member states and a supporting representative of the Secretary-General were subsequently blurred when Bernadotte tragically became the victim of an assassination on 17 September 1948. On the same day, Lie took the initiative to uphold the UN effort in Palestine. He contacted the president of the Security Council and proposed that he would send a cablegram to his representative (Bunche), empowering him to assume full authority of the Palestine mission until further notice. With this, Bunche became de facto acting mediator in Palestine. The Security Council approved that telegram the next day, thus establishing a sort of improvised nomination procedure. Seen in retrospect, this appointment is quite remarkable for two reasons: The first is that the personal representative of the Secretary-General, elevated to a new position, would eventually earn the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950 for his work in negotiating an armistice. The second is the fact that Bunche’s improvised rehatting paved the way for a stronger role of the Secretary-General in directly appointing SRSGs with substantial mandates that member states would approve but not necessarily select and control.

Although this is a rather special case, it is nonetheless a clear indication that the deployment of representatives of the Secretary-General need not be confined to the pragmatic functionalist understanding of representation. This consideration offers the opportunity to link up with the 2012 John Holmes Memorial Lecture.
Lecturer, Christer Jönsson, who in his book *Essence of Diplomacy* (coauthored with Martin Hall) dealt intensively with the question of diplomatic representation.\(^\text{19}\) Here, we find a number of features that make representation a special concept and I can list only some of them. First, representation seems to be a fundamental feature of human existence—people represent themselves, ideas, and meanings every time they have encounters with others. Second, the concept of representation implies a special relationship between the object or person that is represented and the object or person that represents. This relationship can be understood in terms of principal-agent theory with all of the possible dynamics that this theory captures.\(^\text{20}\) Third, this relationship is located in a spectrum that reaches from accountability to authorization. In the former model the representer is bound by the words and actions of the represented to whom they are accountable, whereas in the latter the represented may be bound by the words and actions of the representer that has been authorized to act in their name.\(^\text{21}\) The difference and space between the represented and the representer can be defined as leeway, discretion, latitude, or scope of action and obviously varies in different settings. Jönsson and Hall discuss various examples of different diplomats who have carried out their tasks in different ways. They also show that principal-agent theory is very much applicable to the situation of diplomats representing individual governments and states. At the same time, they point to the fact that the question of “who their ‘real’ principal is”\(^\text{22}\) is debatable: the foreign minister, the government, the ruling party, or the electorate could come into play. Principal-agent theory also teaches us that collective principals normally open up more scope of action for agents who can act in the shadow of disagreement or lack of precision in instructions given to them.\(^\text{23}\) Although this dynamic is clearly working already at the level of national diplomats, it also seems to work and may be even stronger in the case of representatives of international organizations or their executive heads.\(^\text{24}\) When we understand SRSGs as agents, we have to ask ourselves: (1) if the represented (or principal) is the Secretary-General; (2) if the represented (or principal) is the member states that support or created the SRSG’s mandate; (3) if the represented (or principal) is the member states that consented the SRSG will work on an assignment within their territory; or (4) if the true *principals* of UN representatives are the UN *principles* laid down in the Charter. While it may be relatively easy to say who authorized an SRSG, it is more difficult to say to whom the SRSG is (or actually feels to be) accountable. So, already before we have taken a closer look at the development of SRSGs in the UN context, the theoretical and conceptual stage is in a way set. One would expect them to have some scope of action that different representatives in different contexts may use in different ways.

After the initial (rather improvised) use of representatives, a more specific use can be traced back to the tenure of Dag Hammarskjöld and his efforts to alleviate Cold War tensions through his style of private diplomacy.
and an enlarged concept of technical assistance for the benefit of newly independent countries. Hammarskjöld’s use of representatives did in fact transform or enlarge the pragmatic functionalist understanding of their work to a political and symbolic understanding. A case in point is that of Pier Spinelli, director of the UN office in Geneva, who was sent as SRSG to Jordan in 1958. Without going into all the details of that assignment, we have to recall that tensions in the region at the time included inner turmoil and intra-Arab rivalries as well as great-power politics that added up to a highly volatile situation. Trying to deal with this situation, the Security Council had agreed on sending a UN Observer Group to Lebanon in 1958 in order to avoid further military incursions and troubles for that country. The situation in Jordan, where the king was regarded to be closely linked to the West, was more complicated as the government had asked for British military support and declined an international observer group. The Security Council, split along the front lines of the Cold War, could not agree on a common course of action in Jordan and it was left to an emergency session of the General Assembly (under the Uniting-for-Peace procedure) to deal with the question. In Resolution 1237, the Assembly asked the Secretary-General to make “in consultation with the governments concerned . . . such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in Lebanon and Jordan.”

This vague task was at least an invitation to travel to the region. Hammarskjöld visited the countries and came up with a report that charted the course for further action. In that report, he stressed that, also in his dealings with the regional governments, he wanted to translate the terms of the Assembly resolution “into a living reality” and therefore had established a “United Nations organ” in Jordan by appointing Spinelli as his special representative. This was in fact the first time that such an operation of the UN was created without the direct authorization of the Security Council or the General Assembly. Hammarskjöld’s move was risky but, as it provided a face-saving way out of the intersection of various interests, he got away with it. A contemporary observer noted, “Nobody objected to Mr. Hammarskjöld’s creative efforts in this situation; in fact, delegations would have been surprised if something rather novel had not developed.”

It is interesting to see how this new model of a representative was framed. George Ivan Smith, Hammarskjöld’s press officer on his trip to Jordan, recounts how Hammarskjöld pondered the question of what to do:

It is a nice touch of history, because while he was searching for some kind of diplomatic method, we could see over the road the ruins of an old Greek theatre and chickens were jumping up and down on the stone balconies. So he said, “You see, if we bring military people in, the surrounding Arab states will take that to mean that they were in fact regarded as the threat to Jordan. But something has to be done.” [a long pause] “Perhaps just a chap kicking around here.” Later that day at my Press conference, I interpreted that as “UN presence.”
“UN presence” from then on came to be used as a container for various UN actions. But the term also ties in with the aforementioned reflections on representation. Spinelli was seen to be an extension of the Secretary-General as his most immediate principal who, in a broad mandate from a collective principal (the General Assembly) was working in upholding the principles of the Charter. While Bunche’s transformation from personal representative to mediator had much to do with improvisation, Hammarskjöld’s appointment of Spinelli already signaled a more systematic activity of the Secretary-General who—in the face of inaction by the Security Council and the need to operationalize directives from the General Assembly—translated abstract mandates “into a living reality” (i.e., a personalized presence).

This leads to the question of the legal basis of the work of SRSGs. Much the same as with the Blue Helmets, there is no direct reference to SRSGs in the UN Charter. But the close link to the Secretary-General implies that especially the articles of Chapter XV on the Secretariat also have relevance for the SRSGs. Article 97 identifies the Secretary-General as the “chief administrative officer of the organization” with the concurrent power to lead and appoint an administration of international staff working around the globe. The prerogative of selecting individuals working for the UN, stipulated in Article 101, thus ultimately lies with the Secretary-General and also applies to the selection of SRSGs. As international civil servants they have to observe the strict standards of international loyalty laid down in Article 100, which aims to protect the staff from pressure and undue influence by member states but also commands them to work for the fulfillment of the aims and principles of the organization. Chapter XV contains two further provisions, which deal with the political competences of Secretaries-General and, by analogy, apply to the work of the SRSGs representing them. Article 98 states that the Secretary-General “shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him” by the other main UN organs. This provision opens the door for every major organ of the UN to give specific mandates to the Secretary-General, which may (as in the case of Jordan) reach well beyond purely administrative services and today include the organization and supervision of large peacekeeping missions that are routinely headed by SRSGs. Since Secretaries-General cannot personally engage in the coordination and supervision of many or all missions around the globe, they typically work with someone who represents them in the field. The wording of Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), relating to the situation in Sudan, illustrates this particular mechanism as one example out of many because here the Council asked the Secretary-General to work for specific tasks and coordinate all UN activities in a given country “through his Special Representative.” The political activities of Secretaries-General, however, are not limited to tasks directly entrusted to them by the major organs. Article 99 states that the Secretary-General “may bring to the attention of the Security...
Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” The potential of this provision is remarkable, as it explicitly gives the Secretary-General an area of personal discretion in deciding what kind of situation or event may threaten peace and security. On that basis, the Secretaries-General engage in fact-finding and good offices missions—often through their special representatives. As we have already observed, the titles of SRSGs vary considerably. But with a view toward the Charter, one could distinguish a special representative of the Secretary-General from a personal representative of the Secretary-General by the difference between Article 98 and Article 99. The latter is working more on the initiative of the Secretary-General as the former. Unfortunately, this difference also is not strictly followed in appointment practice.

Hammarskjöld used the Spinelli model in a number of other assignments, most notably in the case of Laos.32 The practice of appointing SRSGs was challenged from time to time by member states, especially by the Soviet Union that argued the Secretary-General was taking on a role that properly belonged to the Security Council alone. But this argument did not receive much support and was in fact challenged by other member states of the Council, as a further debate in 1966 showed when U Thant decided to send a representative to mediate between Thailand and Cambodia.33 He did this with the consent of the governments concerned and with subsequent information (and not direct prior authorization) of the Council. Building on these precedents, the use of SRSGs developed considerably over the past decades.

Individual Actors
The following data stems from a database on UN SRSGs developed as part of a research project funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research.34 The database aims to cover the activity of representatives during the first sixty-five years of the UN. It distinguishes three main categories: the database currently holds 378 individual persons (first category) from 102 different countries who at different times held various high-level appointments (second category). Since some of these persons worked on several occasions, the total number of high-level appointments is now at 569. The third category of general relevance is that of mandates: a mandate is a task that is being dealt with by SRSGs. The first officeholder in a specific mandate establishes a newly created high-level appointment whereas those personalities that directly or coherently succeed that first personality are counted as follow-up appointments. There are obvious difficulties in tracing these persons, their appointments, and mandates. The UN itself does not hold a comprehensive record of this kind of activity, a fact that at least partly has to do with the effort of some officeholders to work low key, behind the scenes, and with a minimum paper trail. One also cannot rely on budget plans since a good num-
number of these assignments are on an actually employed or even symbolic one-dollar basis. Even more difficult than establishing the existence of SRSGs is the task to specify concrete dates for the beginning and the end of their assignment. The temporal unit counted as a rule was therefore set as one year. Respective appointments, personalities, and mandates are coded as being “active” in a given year if that activity is documented in at least two different sources for that specific year (thus, not necessarily meaning that they were active from January to December). With these basic orientations some trends emerge from the database.

The growth of SRSG appointments over time is quite impressive. Starting with the first individual appointments, the number of SRSGs increased slightly over the first decades of the UN but did not get past a dozen active appointments per year. It is only in the latter half of the 1980s that we can observe a dramatic and steep increase in SRSG activity. The numbers develop from eight at the beginning of the 1980s to fourteen a decade later and over fifty at the start of the new century. The upward trend then continues and goes beyond the mark of eighty active SRSGs at the beginning of the 2010s.

Another way of looking at this trend data is to sort the appointments to the respective Secretaries-General that had initiated them. Keeping in mind that the Secretaries-General did not have the same amount of years in office, the picture nonetheless offers some further observations. With over 200 counts Annan, in his ten years in office, issued the most appointments. His term in office represents a peak in SRSG activity. But the increase is discernible for all officerholders. Adding further to that, all of the Secretaries-General preceding Annan had issued more newly created than follow-up appointments, which in sum accounts for the overall increase through the decades. But this increase seems to have come to some sort of consolidation with Annan who not only is the Secretary-General who issued most appointments in terms of absolute numbers, but also the first where the number of follow-up appointments surpasses the number of newly created appointments. The numbers for Ban Ki-moon, so far, seem to support that trend.

As far as the regional breakdown is concerned, the dramatic increase at the beginning of the 1990s can be said to be due primarily to increases in SRSGs working in Africa and the number of SRSGs that worked on transregional thematic issues. At the beginning of the 2010s, these two groups each account for about a third of all the active SRSGs working worldwide after the peak of SRSGs working in Africa was reached in the middle of the 2000s with about thirty appointments. SRSG appointments in any other region do not surpass fifteen per year during the whole period of time, with Europe being the short-lived exception in 1999. Looking at the countries to which the SRSGs were deployed it is not surprising to see that, in the first sixty-five years of the UN, long-term missions account for the highest numbers of SRSGs: Cyprus with nearly thirty SRSGs over the years is followed by West-
ern Sahara, Haiti, Burundi, and Somalia with between eighteen and fifteen appointments.

Apart from regional differentiation, it is the nature of the tasks that SRSGs have been given that illustrates yet another trend. The rough distinction between representatives, envoys, and advisers is only a first try at grasping the nature of their activities since these titles are not used in a systematic connection with peacekeeping, peacemaking, or thematic work. The database therefore tried to employ a set of coded activities ranging from humanitarian assistance to thematic work. Coding these activities for such a diversity of appointments over such a long period of time is rather difficult. For example, it is not really possible to nicely distinguish peacekeeping from peacebuilding activities as these will overlap in the majority of cases. Taking into account some difficult cases and hard choices in coding one appointment with only one kind of activity, the database again offers some interesting trends. The peak in SRSG appointments following the 1990s seems to be mostly due to peacekeeping/peacebuilding activities and thematic SRSGs. The numbers develop not in a linear way, but definitely increase dramatically after they have been under ten appointments for the decades preceding 1990. Taking the reference years 1990, 2000, and 2010, the development is two, six, and twenty-nine for thematic SRSGs and five, sixteen, and twenty-nine for peacekeeping/peacebuilding SRSGs, respectively. Peacemaking and good-offices activities are also increasing in a remarkable way (nine, twenty-eight, and seventeen), but the trend is more ambivalent here. So, for example, the peak in the number of peacemaking SRSGs was reached in 1999 (thirty-two) due to short-term assignments, for example, in Tajikistan, Burundi, and Macedonia that were not continued in the following year. There were nineteen peacemaking and twenty-five peacekeeping/peacebuilding SRSGs in 2003 but, whereas the number of the former declines from then on, the latter number increases suggesting that there could be an interdependence between these two kinds of activities. One of these interdependencies can be seen in the argument that the end of the Cold War did open up new opportunities for peacemaking efforts but, since quite a few of them were successful, they were terminated—or in some cases transferred into a peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation. Thus, there may be an element of sequencing at play in the trends here. Another interdependence is also noteworthy: in some conflicts, the UN is represented with a double presence of advisers and envoys. Cases in point are most notably Western Sahara and Cyprus where there is a parallel presence of an SRSG (running the peacekeeping/peacebuilding mission) and a special envoy (working on good offices/peacemaking).

A look at the home countries of SRSGs (again referring to the totality of appointments) reveals that they seem to be a truly international group of people, although the regions of the world are not represented according to their demographical weight. About 40 percent of the high-level appointments
through the decades were taken on by people from Europe, with Scandinavian countries being prominent in that group. The list of “SRSР contributing countries” is headed by the United States with just over fifty appointments since 1946. The next five countries include the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Norway with just over twenty appointments. Next in line are Italy and Algeria whose eighteen appointments are, however, a good illustration of the effect that active persons have for the counting of appointments.

Thirteen of these eighteen appointments for Algeria were taken on by Lakhdar Brahimi who also heads the list of SRSРs with the most multiple appointments during their career. Next in line are Álvaro de Soto of Peru (seven appointments) and Ian Martin of the United Kingdom (six appointments in which his work as special adviser for postconflict planning in Libya and subsequently as special representative heading the UN Support Mission in Libya are counted as two separate cases).

It is no coincidence that among the leading multiple SRSРs no woman is counted. The appointment of women as SRSРs is a practice that only recently has been used more frequently due to the efforts of Ban to follow up on Security Council Resolution 1325, which explicitly deals with the under-representation of women in this context. The trend data is also quite indicative regarding the age of SRSРs at their first high-level appointment. The majority of SRSРs between 1946 and 2011 were appointed in their mid- to late fifties.

With the help of additional biographical information, we can also gain some trend data on the profile and background of SRSРs that points to a number of commonalities. For reasons both of practicality and comparability, we analyzed the official UN press releases containing relevant biographical notes. If we look at conflict-related SRSРs (i.e., SRSРs with an activity that is either coded as “good offices/peacemaking” or “peacekeeping/peacebuilding”) and focus on those SRSРs that took on newly created appointments during the 1990s and 2000s, the following picture emerges: the average age increased slightly (from fifty-four to fifty-eight years). Previous executive experience in the respective home country seems to be a key requirement (slightly decreasing from 54 percent to 49 percent) while non-governmental organization (NGO) experience seems to become more common (14 percent to 23 percent). Previous work at an embassy in a country that is one of the permanent members of the Security Council also seems to be relevant, although the share of people with that experience has more than halved (24 percent to 11 percent). The most striking finding, however, is the fact that the share of SRSРs who already had previous SRSР experience dramatically increased more than threefold from a mere 16 percent to about 49 percent in the comparison of the respective sample groups from the 1990s and 2000s. This can be interpreted as an indicator for the professionalization of this group of actors. This interpretation would imply that these personali-
ties have qualities and capacities that can be put to use in different contexts and mandates. Different as the profiles of individual SRSGs may be, there seem to be some discernible elements of a common education—understood in a broad sense of the word. The rationale for choosing a specific SRSG clearly consists of various elements that have to be taken into account. Former SRSG Pierre Schori recalls,

When UN Secretary-General (SG) Kofi Annan asked me to be his Special Representative (SRSG) for Côte d’Ivoire, he argued that the situation called for a person who had executive and legislative experience in government and parliament, insider experience dealing with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), one who came from a country with no colonial past and a tradition of supporting the liberation struggle in Africa, who spoke French and personally knew African leaders.56

Thematic SRSGs, which I have identified as a second distinctive group of high-level appointments that accounts for the steep increase in the number of SRSGs, show a similar but different pattern. While their average age is much the same as that of their conflict-related colleagues, executive experience in the home country seems to be less (27 percent) and NGO experience more important (33 percent). While the position at an embassy in a Permanent Five country obviously does not carry that much weight (3 percent), former membership in international commissions (36 percent) ranks highly among the shared characteristics of this group of SRSGs. In contrast to the conflict-related SRSGs the share of persons with previous SRSG experience is also low (3 percent), which can be explained by the fact that most of these thematic mandates are rather new and distinct from each other. One common feature does, however, link conflict-related and thematic SRSGs. Former positions in the UN system rank highly for both (49 percent and 61 percent, respectively). Besides the aspects of a common education, one could speak of a common socialization of this special kind of actor. SRSGs in general and thematic SRSGs in particular seem to be a good example of the intersections between the first, the second, and the third United Nations.37 This conclusion already points to the link between individual actors and international agency.

International Agency and Leadership
The understanding that individuals play an important part in the workings of international organizations is in fact something that goes back to the early work of yet another Holmes Memorial Lecturer, Robert Cox. In an article from 1969 he postulated, “The quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organizations.”38 Exactly because international organizations
do not or at least did not work within the perimeters of established structures, fixed constitutional competences, and roles as well as concurring expectations, they carry with them the need to do what Thomas Franck described as the imperative to “invent themselves.” Cox focused on the executive leadership at the top of the organization, but it is not taking the argument too far to also apply his general perspective on the SRSGs because of their close link and even resemblance with the Secretary-General. Cox discussed the leadership of executive heads as an asset that could lead international organizations to become autonomous actors in the international system.

The fact that individual leadership is connected to international agency is indeed described in more recent research by Bob Reinalda, who explicitly draws that line with regard to the experience of the International Labour Organization; Joel Oestreich, who shows this with regard to the transformation of the work of the UN Children’s Fund, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization; and Thomas Weiss, whose analysis of individual UN staff members is led by the argument that “people matter.” The latter is an argument that is also the basis of Fabrizio Hochschild’s study on leadership in the United Nations, which applies findings from leadership research to the special context of the world organization. The works of Oran Young on various forms of leadership in international society, Kent Kille on the leadership styles of the Secretaries-General, and Martha Finnmore and Kathryn Sikkink on norm entrepreneurship give us new analytical and conceptual tools to investigate certain aspects of personality and their influence on politics. There seems to be agreement that the analysis of the agency of international organizations is best undertaken by using a spectrum of theoretical approaches ranging from principal-agent theory to constructivism, while at the same time research on individuals in that context is still “an important lacuna in IO research.”

It has to be underlined that SRSG activity per se is not something that is naturally good or effective. There is the danger of a proliferation of SRSGs that can create problems of its own. Impressive as the increase in their sheer numbers is, it does not signify that each and every appointment is a suitable and effective way to address a particular challenge or problem. When Smith coined the term “UN presence” in Jordan, he regretted his invention because it “began to be used [as] an ointment suggested for every wound.” Hence, there may be an element of unnecessary proliferation, duplication of efforts, wishes by members states and individuals for prestigious postings, and also pretence as some SRSGs—just as some peace operations in the past—end up as mere manifestations of the international community’s will to do something while at the same time evading further efforts to address the root causes of a problem. But the concrete question of what doing something in the absence of strict guidelines and amidst changing environments means, again points to the possibility of leadership to be exercised by SRSGs.
Leadership by SRSGs has several features. There are some hierarchical elements of leadership in their work as the aforementioned “Note on Guidance” specified for conflict-related SRSGs: “The SRSG establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the UN Country Team and ensures that all the UN components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach.” The need to exercise leadership has become some sort of topos in the writing and assessment of UN activities. The 2000 Brahimi Report states that “effective dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness and one that struggles to maintain any of those attributes.” This reference to leadership as a sort of self-evident imperative in peace operations is now ubiquitous. Dealing with “The Art of Successful Mandate Implementation” a paragraph from the 2008 “Capstone Principles” issued by the UN Departments of Peacekeeping and Field Support is a further case in point: “Mission leaders [i.e., usually SRSGs] must underscore the need for all components to work towards shared objectives under the leadership of a cohesive and collaborative mission leadership team.” As a consequence of this, more and more missions have a structure with the SRSG on top and one or more deputy SRSGs who often wear a second hat as resident or humanitarian coordinator in a country.

The diversity of mandates and challenges with which SRSGs are confronted clearly rules out a static set of rules and procedures for all times and places. But as a starting point, a standard definition from Bernard M. Bass may provide some orientation: leadership is “an interaction between two or more members of a group that often involves a structuring or restructuring of the situation and of the perception and expectations of the members. Leaders are agents of change . . . directing the attention of other members to goals and the paths to achieve them.” Whether working on conflict-related mandates or on the promotion of certain issues as thematic SRSGs, this general definition seems to be compatible with the situation of SRSGs. The same holds true for the special definition of leadership that Ramesh Thakur used in an analysis of the role of the Secretary-General: “Leadership consists of articulating a bold and noble vision for a community and establishing standards of achievement and conduct, explaining why they matter and inspiring or coaxing others to adopt the agreed goals and benchmarks as their personal goals.” Here, the close link between the Secretary-General and the SRSGs reemerges and we see that leadership is something that arises from communicative action rather than material resources. Based on his interviews on the experience of over fifty UN officials, Hochschild underlines that leadership positions regularly stem “less from resources, power or knowledge, than from the representation of UN values, standards and norms. Where an approach is not perceived to be congruent with the value system they imply, credibility and influence are forfeited.” But abstract values do
not always offer clear guidance and may in fact create dilemmas of their own, which call for the application of very personal and political ethics combined with intense efforts for convincing others. Peck, in this context, argues that the work of SRSGs requires “constant negotiation with a wide range of actors” not only in the field, but also with headquarters, donors, troop contributors, and others trying “to engender political support, to mobilize leverage, and to find the resources needed to sustain the mission and make a significant impact on the mission area.” Associated with this aspect of leadership by SRSGs is the circumstance that they operate in an environment that is prone to the exercise of leadership. Echoing an insight from Fred Greenstein’s early work on personality and politics, situations that call for transformation and restructuring offer the best chance for individual personality to be of crucial importance. Both the SRSGs working in conflict environments and those working to strengthen new norms seem to fall into that general category of actors.

In addition to these features of SRSG leadership, we can also conceptualize the special work of SRSGs in three dimensions that, once again, echo the tasks with which the Secretary-General is confronted. Much the same as the Secretary-General, SRSGs are supposed to provide leadership in administration, leadership in conflict, and leadership in ideas.

Leadership in Administration
An illustration of this context can be taken from the experience of Sergio Vieira de Mello in Yugoslavia where he had to deal with differences between the humanitarian, military, and political actors associated with the UN presence there. According to his biographer, Samantha Power, “Vieira de Mello knew that political envoys tended to view humanitarians as expendable ‘grocery deliverers’ who would play no important role in high-stakes political talks.” In contrast to such a view, Vieira de Mello (also from his own experience) tried to establish an integrative approach that would involve all of the different actors, judging that “the most difficult thing in a peacekeeping mission is the internal peacekeeping.” These efforts can be linked to what Bruce D. Jones calls “strategic coordination.” Jones also argues “there can be little doubt that there is a high correlation between effective strategic coordination and the presence and good management of an SRSG or equivalent.” Leadership in this context is team leadership and presupposes the (contested) freedom to assemble one’s own staff which, for example, Vieira de Mello repeatedly insisted on.

Leadership in Conflict
A good example of leadership by an SRSG in the effort to promote peace in a (post)conflict environment is the innovation of actively engaging a so-called
“group of friends,” consisting of the main stakeholders in a peacemaking or peacebuilding effort. This mechanism fulfills various functions such as lending support and providing guarantees with respect to implementation. It also integrates diverse mediation efforts under one common roof, “[enhancing] the room for independent action of the secretary-general and his representatives, [bringing] leverage to bear on both parties, and [bolstering] the equilibrium between them.” For de Soto who first employed this concept in El Salvador, one of the purposes of the group of friends—rather symptomatically—was “to intimate that we [the United Nations] were in the lead.” For good or bad, SRSGs have made various choices regarding the approach, scope, speed, structure, and format of nurturing a peace process. Individual experience and inclination over time become institutional memory and a toolbox of dealing with conflict. These actions may ultimately form new doctrine. As Margret P. Karns argues, “Through the exercise of the authority, autonomy, and discretion of the Secretary-Generalship and through those whom he empowered as his special and personal representatives, it is clear that Pérez de Cuéllar deserves considerable credit for fostering a number of new ideas about UN post-conflict peacebuilding roles.” An important role of SRSGs as managers of conflict can also be seen in their preparation of reports to the Security Council. They normally prepare the statement of the Secretary-General for meetings of the Security Council and, from time to time, also are in a position to directly speak before the Council. Leadership in that situation can be measured by fulfilling what the Brahimi Report on the reform of peace operations called the imperative to “tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.” SRSGs also can use this opportunity to present their individual assessments and suggestions for action as some have done.

Leadership in Ideas

Here the principals to be represented are the principles of the UN Charter, which brings this dimension of leadership in the vicinity of norm entrepreneurship. Thematic SRSGs can in fact be regarded as ex officio norm entrepreneurs. A good example is the mandate of the special representative on violence against children, which tasks the SRSG to “act as a high-profile and independent global advocate to promote the prevention and elimination of all forms of violence against children in all regions, acting as a catalyst to stimulate the engagement of Member States and civil society to prevent and respond to violence against children.” It is worthwhile noting that the role of norms can be a quite practical issue also for conflict-related SRSGs. Jan Pronk’s expulsion from Sudan in 2006 on the basis of claims that he was raising psychological warfare against the Sudanese army is a telling example. In his weblog (the very establishment of which is an apt illustration of an agent using leeway since there was no specific mandate asking or allowing him to open that route of communication and information), Pronk wrote a telling statement:
The Government is still violating peace and ceasefire agreements as well as principles, norms and values of the UN. It continues to do so, despite having signed these agreements and despite that Sudan, as a member state of the United Nations, is bound to uphold these principles. In my capacity as Special Representative of the United Nations I still consider it my duty to disseminate these norms and values and to report about violations.  

Concurrent with the basics of leadership research, we have to keep in mind that leadership per se is not to be equated with success, but rather that it depicts a certain kind of effort. The categorization of leadership according to different dimensions also implies that qualifications and skills for one dimension may not necessarily work in other contexts.

Two Illustrations
Without the space to provide further individual cases of SRSGs, I conclude my argument on the interdependence of individual actors, international agency, and leadership with observations on the two most prominent groups of SRSGs that I identified: conflict-related SRSGs and thematic SRSGs. How does their individual action translate into international agency? In order to do this, I leave the level of individual cases and rather look at their accumulated effect as a group of specific actors.

As we have seen, the number of conflict-related SRSGs—working on peacemaking or peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates—has seen a steep increase since the late 1980s. This increase offers an interesting match to the decrease in intrastate conflict that the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Human Security Report have identified as starting at the end of the 1980s. Although the report discusses various factors that could account for this development (the end of colonialism, the spread of democratic governance, increased state capacity, and international accountability for domestic conduct), the “upsurge of international activism” is specified as “the single best explanation for the extraordinary decrease.” The evidence for this thesis is presented in various parameters that experienced a significant increase in the years since 1990 (e.g., preventive diplomacy missions, Groups of Friends of the Secretary-General, and peacekeeping operations). SRSGs seem to be yet another measure of international activism. In a comment to the 2005 Human Security Report, I argue with two colleagues that SRSG presence is at least as good an indicator of international activism as is the presence of peacekeeping operations since there were even more SRSG presences than peacekeeping operations in states that eventually ended intrastate conflict. The 2007 Human Security Report echoed this and identified SRSGs as “a good proxy measure for the UN’s overall efforts to enhance security in a region.” The performance of the UN in its core mission, the maintenance of international peace and security, can thus be seen partly as a function of the accumulated effect that its representatives have.
A similar, but different, mechanism may be discernible when looking at those SRSGs that have seen the most coherent increase in number and tasks since the 1990s: thematic SRSGs. Recalling Goulding’s assessment of the “bewildering variety of titles” that SRSGs have, this bewilderment gets even bigger when looking at the diversity of topics that these SRSGs are working on. Just focusing on newly created appointments from the past fifteen years results in thirty-two different issues that were dealt with by thematic SRSGs (see Table 1).

As we have seen with reference to the SRSG on violence against children, most of these SRSGs represent by becoming a presence themselves—not necessarily with office space in New York, but certainly as a distinct voice and promoter of ideas in direct consultation with diplomats and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Human Security Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Impact of Armed Conflict on Children</td>
<td>Olara A. Otunnu</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Pe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>SASG</td>
<td>Gender Issues and Advancement of Women</td>
<td>Angela E.V. King</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>C Pe Po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>No new appointments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>PRSG</td>
<td>UN Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations</td>
<td>Giandomenico Picco</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
<td>José Mariá Figueres</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Ec</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Human Rights Defenders</td>
<td>Hina Jilani</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>SASG</td>
<td>Sport for Development and Peace</td>
<td>Adolf Ogi</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>C H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>SESG</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS in Africa</td>
<td>Stephen Lewis</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>HRSG</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries/ Landlocked Developing Countries/ Small Island Developing States</td>
<td>Anwarul K. Chowdhury</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Ec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>SASG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
<td>Jeffrey D. Sachs</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>C Ec En F H Pe Po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>SESG</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS in Asia and in the Pacific</td>
<td>Nafis Sadik</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>SASG</td>
<td>Global Compact</td>
<td>John Ruggie</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Ec</td>
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Table 1 Thematic SRSGs, 1997–2013 (first officeholders in new mandates)
Table 1  continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Titlea</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Human Security Dimensionb</th>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>SASG</td>
<td>Prevention of Genocide</td>
<td>Juan E. Méndez</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>C Pe Po</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RSG</td>
<td>Human Rights for Internally Displaced Persons</td>
<td>Walter Kälin</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>C Pe</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>The Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations</td>
<td>John Ruggie</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Ec</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SUNC</td>
<td>Avian and Human Influenza</td>
<td>David Nabarro</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>SESG</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>Jorge Sampaio</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Migration</td>
<td>Peter Sutherland</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>C Ec</td>
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<td>Climate Change</td>
<td>Gro Harlem Brundtland</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>En</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>SASG</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
<td>Edward Luck</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Pe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SESG</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>Ray Chambers</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>H</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Innovative Financing for Development</td>
<td>Philippe Douste-Blazy</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Ec</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Violence Against Children</td>
<td>Marta Santos Pais</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Pe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition</td>
<td>David Nabarro</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Sexual Violence in Conflict</td>
<td>Margot Wallström</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Pe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SASG</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>Yukio Takasu</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>C Ec En F H Pe Po</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>No new appointments</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Global Education</td>
<td>Gordon Brown</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>C Ec Po</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Post-2015 Development Planning</td>
<td>Amina Mohammed</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>C Ec En F H Pe Po</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>ESG</td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Ahmad Alhendawi</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>C Ec Po</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: a. ESG, envoy of the Secretary-General; HRSG, high representative of the Secretary-General; PRSG, personal representative of the Secretary-General; RSG, representative of the Secretary-General; SA, special adviser; SASG, special adviser of the Secretary-General; SESG, special envoy of the Secretary-General; SRSG, special representative of the Secretary-General; SUNC, senior United Nations system coordinator.

b. C, community; Ec, economic; En, environment; F, food; H, health; Pe, personal; Po, political.
media as well as with governments, relevant agencies, and NGOs worldwide. The list of topics and people, at first sight, may seem arbitrary, with each of these mandates having a special history of their own (a good case being Francis Deng’s work on internally displaced persons).78 But taking a second glance, a quite distinctive pattern emerges as each of these mandates can be connected to at least one dimension of human security as stipulated in the 1994 Human Development Report that ushered in a new understanding of security in the UN system and beyond.79 Seen in this perspective, the work of these thematic SRSGs is both an indicator and modus operandi of a world organization that—under the “supernorm”80 of human security is about to “redefine as necessary the major aims which the organization is to pursue and to explain these in such a way as to gain the necessary political support.”81 This quotation from Cox in 1969 refers to the tasks of “competent advisers” of the executive head. But it also seems to fit perfectly with the new dynamic of thematic SRSGs. Their accumulated effect in the formation and implementation of the normative work of the UN offers a similar pattern as that of the conflict-related SRSGs. Whereas the initiative for their appointment may also be influenced by the General Assembly or the Security Council, the Secretary-General appointed them and thus initiated a special dynamic. This dynamic is not one of automatic growth and success. There may be individual as well as institutional overstretch, personal failures that have an effect on the institution as a whole (or even on the idea represented), and instances where the best effort does not gain traction due to structural obstacles. But representation by SRSGs is more than simple delegation of a specifically prescribed activity. It aims to create a presence and leeway for individual action that can be used in exercising leadership, which in turn may (or may not) enlarge the scope of action of an individual actor and international agency. Agency and structure, also in this perspective, do interact in various ways.82 Although individual leadership alone will not end wars or change norms, the actions of these individuals eventually also influence structure in a kind of feedback loop. This would imply a research agenda that takes individuals seriously as actors with specific personal, social, ethical, and professional characteristics that account for their potential to play a leading role in the invention and implementation of norms or the creation and transformation of social structures—especially in situations of structural conflict and change.

The John Holmes Lectures have tended to treat a certain aspect of the policies, politics, and polities of world organization that needs to receive more attention from academics and practitioners alike. My aim here was to illustrate an equation consisting of the elements of representation, leadership, and international agency. Individual actors emerge as an important level of analysis in explaining institutional agency, the growth of international organizations, and the broader dynamics of world politics. In a speech in Oslo nearly fifty years ago, Holmes spoke about another type of actor that, in his time, had emerged in the UN system; namely, UN police forces. Addressing the audience, he said,
Our concern is with a category of international mechanisms that have grown out of experience, which are known to work, however imperfectly. . . . The value of our subject matter is that it is related to the real world of conflict, confusion and cross-purposes. We must nevertheless try to see it in perspective, try to set it against what the political philosophers say is required and estimate in what ways it is wanting. We must examine how or whether it fulfils a function in men’s progress to a governed world, and even ask whether we are on the right or wrong track.83

I like to think that Holmes would have found an interest in the SRSGs as yet another new international mechanism grown out of experience. 

Notes
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12. Ibid., p. 52.

13. See, for example, Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Manuel Fröhlich, Political Ethics and the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General (London: Routledge, 2008).

14. These and other data are drawn from the SRSG Database 1946–2011 (Version 2.0); see note 34 below.


16. See UN General Assembly, Res. 186 (S-2) (14 May 1948). Note that Urquhart quotes the official title “chief representative” (p. 158), whereas Lie also speaks of Bunche as his “personal representative” (p. 187). It is also noteworthy that Bunche had previously been “special assistant” to Victor Hoo’s mission cited above.

17. UN Doc. S/1003 (18 September 1948). The cablegram was in fact sent by then–assistant Secretary-General for Security Council affairs, Arkady Sobolev, who was in charge in New York while Lie was traveling in Europe.

18. See the protocol of the meeting in UN Doc. S/PV. 358 S/INF/2/Rev. 1 (III) (18 September 1948).


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 108.

23. Ibid.

24. See also the case studies in Hawkins et al., Delegation and Agency.


27. See the report of the Secretary-General in UN Doc. A/3934/Rev. 1 (29 September 1958), pars. 21 and 29.

28. Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, p. 221.

29. Cited in Manuel Fröhlich, “‘The Unknown Assignment’: Dag Hammarskjöld in the Papers of George Ivan Smith,” in Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, ed.,

30. For the following see Fröhlich, Political Ethics and the United Nations, pp. 15–48.
32. See Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, pp. 233–265.
34. Numbers refer to the SRSG Database 1946–2011 (Version 2.0) with additions until 2013. The database is compiled as part of a research project by the German Foundation for Peace Research. The sources include primarily official UN documents and reports, with additions from secondary literature and encyclopaedia. Both the existence of individual high-level appointments as well as respective start and end dates had to be confirmed in more than one source. For the following trend data, only appointments whose existence has already been confirmed were used. With a number of appointments and dates still to be confirmed, the absolute numbers may change slightly as the database is refined even more. This should, however, not reverse any trends depicted here. The author would like to thank Dorothea Prell and Patrick Rosenow for their support in assembling the data.
35. This source has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is a single authoritative source. The disadvantage lies in the fact that these biographical notes vary in length and depth, and there is no guarantee that all relevant information is given. The notes also are not available for all of the persons in question (for the 1990s, we find seventy-three personalities of whom twenty-one are not covered by these notes; for the 2000s, there are thirty-five personalities of whom five are not covered). However, if we compare this way of information gathering with a questionnaire, the return rate is quite satisfactory. Note that multiple classifications are possible.
37. See the differentiation in Richard Jolly, Louis Emerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, UN Ideas that Changed the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 32–47.
45. Oran R. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Devel-


49. Cited in Fröhlich, “‘Unknown Assignation,’” p. 22.


57. Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” p. 327.

58. Ibid., p. 328.


60. See for the following also Fröhlich, “Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General.”


63. Bruce D. Jones, *The Challenges for Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001), p. 10. See also de Coning, “SRSGs and DSRSGs,” p. 282, who sees the facilitation of strategic direction and operational coherence as the “primary leadership function of the SRSG,” whose exercise is very much dependent upon SRSG personality and team support from deputy SRSGs.

64. Power, *Chasing the Flame*, p. 268.


66. Ibid., p. 75.


72. See the mandate in GA resolution UN Doc. A/62/141, par. 59.


75. Fröhlich, Bütof, and Lemanski, “Mapping UN Presence.”


77. Goulding, Peacemonger, p. 16.


