The John W. Holmes Lecture: Growing the “Third UN” for People-centered Development—The United Nations, Civil Society, and Beyond

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Three decades ago John Holmes argued that the need for having the kind of “international organizations in which to tackle the inescapably complex economic and social issues in an interdependent world need not be restated.” Despite these words, ten years later, when Donald Puchala and I presented the first “State of the United Nations Report” to the second annual meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), we found an organizational system teetering and tottering on the verge of crisis.1 There was a void of leadership, as well as a crisis of capacity precipitated largely by the refusal of the United States to fulfill its legal obligation to fund UN agencies; and staff morale was at a historic low. One of the main themes that we explored in that report was the challenge to the UN system—as intergovernmental institutions—of dealing with the plethora of global problems that confront the world and dominate the global agenda and that cannot be solved by governmental or intergovernmental means alone. Now, after twenty more years, the illusive quest continues for new avenues and directions for making global governance more effective for promoting sustainable human security and development.

In this context, this article explores the current state of the debate over United Nations–civil society/private sector relations and why this relationship is critical to the future of the UN system and its success in dealing with the nexus of complex issues that crowd the global agenda.2 But one cannot understand the nature and implications of this debate without understanding its history and exploring the various assumptions, logic, worldviews, and intellectual and practical biases that underpin the positions within it.

The UN in Holmesian Perspective

The story begins with John Holmes, in whose honor this essay is being written. In his article examining US-UN relations, “A Non-American Perspective,”3 Holmes argued that it was because the UN was founded on “permanent reality rather than legal fictions” that the system has survived and grown. Understanding the nature of the meanings of that reality and the inherent contradictions and
tensions encompassed within them is critical for understanding the past and present as well as future possibilities of civil UN–civil society/private sector relations. He challenged that

the popular perception of the UN as a failed world government must be corrected. The problem, of course, always has been that the perfervid defenders and malevolent critics have the same misunderstanding. They are concerned with structure rather than with function. What might correct this misunderstanding is the involvement of far more people in the functions for which the UN system exists. . . . More precise calculation and fewer general slogans are required in determining exactly what is advisable and possible to expect of the UN system. . . . A better perspective is gained by starting from the agenda rather than by concerning oneself primarily with the preservation or improvement of the structure.4

The United Nations, beginning from the 1942 alliance, represented a unique blend of real politic, liberal ideology, idealism, functionalism, and war weariness. John Holmes understood this well. Again quoting Holmes:

Roosevelt deliberately launched the UN with a conference dealing with the practical question of food. The United States was as much responsible as any country for seeing that agencies dealing with relief, international monetary and financial questions, and civil aviation were tackled before San Francisco. The UN in wartime had to be created in the abstract, but it was no Wilsonian philosopher’s dream. Then as now there were things to be done, and institutions were devised or improvised to cope with them.5

The UN that Holmes saw and that Don Puchala and I observed and reported on a decade later was one that was being beaten, battered, and abused by its primary creator—the United States. Twenty years later much has happened, but little seems to have changed—the form has remained basically the same despite all the rhetoric on reform. But a focus on institutional form is narrow and misleading. As regards function, the world body has been undergoing slow but important transformation.

**Putting Things in Contemporary Perspective: The “Third UN”**

In their lead article, “The ‘Third’ United Nations,” in the last issue of *Global Governance*, Thomas Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard Jolly explore the intermingled and interdependent world of NGO-UN relations.6 In doing so, they argue that there is a “third” United Nations. Building on Inis Claude’s conceptualization of “two UNs”7—the intergovernmental bodies made up of member states, and the secretariats composed of international civil servants—they suggest that a “third UN” has evolved consisting of NGOs, academics, consultants, experts, and independent commissions. All three UNs, they suggest, co-exist in symbiotic relationship. In order to understand UN politics, especially as
related to institutional reform, all three UNs need to be considered holistically. This essay endeavors to build on this conceptualization and explore this third United Nations and its potential for enhancing global public policy. In doing so, the focus will be on civil society and the private sector, excluding for this task the fifteen or so UN independent commissions on various topics.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society actors were present and active at the creation of the United Nations in San Francisco. Today, some 3,000 NGOs have some form of consultative status in the UN system. Numerous scholars, including Chadwick Alger, Leon Gordenker, Thomas Weiss, Cyril Ritchie, and others (several among us today), have presented succinct overviews of the evolution and nature of the roles of NGOs in the UN system, consisting of informal engagements as well as formal consultative status. Civil society organizations are engaged in every aspect of global policy processes in the UN system, including agenda setting, advocacy, rule making, standard setting, promotion, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. A problem is that there exists tremendous incoherence within this action set and ambiguity regarding the associated role of civil society in relation to the first two UNs.

In 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a distinguished blue-ribbon panel (part of the “third UN”), chaired by former Brazilian president Fernando Cardoso, to examine the relationship between the UN system and civil society organizations and to recommend ways in which UN agencies might better manage and enhance their relations with such organizations and facilitate the involvement of NGOs from developing countries in UN activities. The Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations (the Cardoso Report) was issued in June 2004. The final report reflected a series of politically negotiated observations—as might be expected—and offered more than two dozen recommendations for action. It was underpinned by four main principles: the UN needs to (1) become an outward-looking organization; (2) embrace a plurality of constituencies; (3) connect the local with the global; and (4) help strengthen democracy for the twenty-first century. In brief summary, it recommended that UN agencies invest more in civil society partnerships; focus on engagement at the country level; strengthen the Security Council to broaden its engagement with civil society; engage with parliamentarians and other elected representatives; and initiate reforms to make accreditation and access by civil society organizations easier.

Cardoso and company argued that “the most powerful case for reaching out beyond its constituency of central Governments and enhancing dialogue and cooperation with civil society is that doing so will make the United Nations more effective.” In the language of the report,

Our starting paradigms also apply to the other panels and are the foundation for the continued relevance of the United Nations: (a) multilateralism no longer

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concerns Governments alone but is now multifaceted, involving many con-
stituencies; the United Nations must develop new skills to service this new
way of working; (b) it must become an outward-looking or network organi-
zation, catalysing the relationships needed to get strong results and not let-
ting the traditions of its formal processes be barriers; (c) it must strengthen
global governance by advocating universality, inclusion, participation and
accountability at all levels; and (d) it must engage more systematically with
world public opinion to become more responsive, to help shape public atti-
tudes and to bolster support for multilateralism.12

At the core of the panel’s recommendations was increasing investment in
multilateral partnerships: “They must be viewed as ‘partnerships to achieve
global goals’ . . . decentralized to relevant country and technical units and driven
by needs, not funding opportunities. To advance this goal necessitates innova-
tions and resources at both the country and global levels.”13 Accordingly, the
panel recommended a number of institutional reforms aimed to facilitate and
make more effective civil society–UN engagement. Unfortunately, these recom-
mendations were by and large rather ambiguous and underspecified—reflecting
undoubtedly the dynamics within the panel on this politically delicate issue.

Willetts’s Critique and Challenge
While to many astute observers it may appear that the Cardoso Report is
headed in a constructive direction, Peter Willetts has challenged that the report
is intellectually incoherent and displays “little understanding of the existing
NGO consultative arrangements” and that it was “poorly received by all sig-
nificant political actors”—by governments, NGOs, and the UN secretary-gen-
eral.14 In assessing the report and its recommendations, he argues that the
panel’s use of three normative arguments—functionalism, corporatism, and
pluralism—leads to confusion because they are incompatible with each other.
Moreover, “the first two approaches represent a threat to the NGO participa-
tion rights that have been operating for the last sixty years at the United Na-
tions. The only morally sound and politically feasible basis for legitimizing
wider NGO participation in the UN system is the democratic claim for all
voices to be heard in the global policy debates.”15

From this perspective, Willetts suggests that the report offered little new
by way of enhancing UN–civil society engagement. While perhaps this might
appear to be the case to the converted advocates of NGO involvement in UN
decisionmaking processes, it clearly is not the case with regard to the “first
UN.” Moreover, however, Willetts’s thesis is not on target regarding the pri-
ority that he suggests be given to so-called democratic process over outcomes
and attainment of organizational missions.

While there are important deficiencies in the Cardoso Report, all is not a
wasteland, and the assumptions on which the report is based are not irrelevant
or any more incoherent than the assumptions underlying the international norms and institution forms on which the UN system is based. As reflected in John Holmes’s observations, the UN from creation was designed to encompass all of the seemingly incoherencies and incompatibilities identified by Willetts—functionalism, corporatism, and liberal democratic ideals. The UN system was designed to create a dynamic synthesis between the Westphalian interstate political legal order and the capitalist world economy, both to be tempered by liberal ideology. Unfortunately for Willetts’s thesis, ignoring such foundations or trying to wish them away is not a proper approach for understanding the contemporary situation or discussing future directions for promoting sustainable human development.

Civil Society, Private Sector, and the UN

In this context, an aim of the remainder of this essay is to reexamine the nature, evolution, and extent of civil society and private sector involvement in the UN system as it relates to enhancing or diminishing the effectiveness of UN agencies in dealing with complex global issues. What is the value added by bringing civil society and other nonstate actors more fully into global policy processes? What are the costs and limitations, and are they worth it?

Regarding the role of civil society in the UN, affairs are not as straightforward as Willetts might like us to believe. Again paraphrasing John Holmes’s writing over three decades ago,

UN purists are somewhat unhappy. If one insists, however, on the need to reform the structure of the UN or on a UN mandate for all that is done in the world, one only strengthens the argument for its futility. Instead, concepts must be adjusted to recognize the values of the galaxy. The UN would collapse if it became too pretentious and assumed an overweening authority. International life is managed to a very large extent by private international bodies—grain exchanges and money exchanges, giant regulatory organizations, and corporations with resources far beyond that of the whole UN budget. What is needed is to incorporate a consciousness of these networks into the designs for world order rather than capture them for an international administration that is simply not mature enough to cope—and possibly never will be.16

This is the essence of Agenda 21, with its focus on including ten major groups (see “Partnerships” section on page 160). A crucial question for us to confront thirty years later as we move forward in the twenty-first century is the following: Is international administration now mature enough to more fully engage these crucial elements of world society? If not, what reforms are needed to create such an enabling environment?
What Has UN Practice Taught Us Over the Past Decades?

In brief, at least the “second UN” has discovered that directly engaging civil society is essential for carrying out institutional mandates effectively. The forms of such engagements are many.

Alger’s work has been enlightening in this regard, especially his analyses of NGOs and people’s movements as, what he terms, “tools for peacebuilding” in the UN. Added to his work have been at least four mechanisms (or additional “peacebuilding tools”) through which the UN and civil society have become engaged that influence global policy processes. These mechanisms are networking and coalition building; global campaigns; parallel conferencing; and partnerships. They serve to facilitate in varying ways stages of global policy process—information/problem identification, issue framing, agenda setting, decisionmaking, monitoring, evaluation, and feedback. Civil society actors are actively engaged in each functional area and make contributions that are unique to an otherwise intergovernmental process—contributions such as advocacy and lobbying, promotion, information creation and dissemination, research/policy analysis and evaluation, rule making/standard setting, and monitoring.

Networking and Coalition Building

Ruggie has succinctly summarized and underscored the importance of networking and networks in global governance policy processes. Networking and coalition building are inherent in umbrella international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) like the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the International Council for Science (ICSU). In essence, umbrella INGOs are coalitions of NGOs that network among themselves. The IUCN, for example, represents a network of over 1,000 organizations and 10,000 experts from around the world. Other leading NGO networks actively and effectively involved in UN policy processes include Jubilee 2000, Climate Change Action Network, International Action Network on Small Arms, Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Networks and coalitions, when viewed in the larger context of global governance, serve as linchpins, bridging organizations and information clearinghouses. They promote solidarity and capacity building and advocate policies, programs, and harmonization.

While most NGO networks grow up outside the UN, sometimes NGO networks are spawned as a result of institutional change in the UN system. In 1973, for example, as a result of the creation of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in Nairobi, a World Assembly of NGOs Concerned with the Global Environment was held, and out of the gathering emerged the Environment Liaison Center International (ELCI). The ELCI represented a coalition of over 500 member organizations that linked more than 6,000 NGOs from around the
world. Regardless of their origins, these networks help facilitate the operational work of the second UN and serve to support various functions of the first UN—information, normative, rule-creating, and rule-supervising functions.

The first UN (General Assembly) also has come to recognize the importance of engaging such networks. The 2001 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on AIDS, for example, launched an ongoing process for engaging civil society in facilitating the UN’s implementation of the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment (DoC) on HIV/AIDS. In preparation for the 2006 five-year review of UNGASS, and again in 2008, the Civil Society Coalition on HIV/AIDS UNGASS was formed to strengthen civil society participation in reviewing progress and in promoting accountability and transparency of the review process. Twelve representatives for stakeholder groups were asked to participate on the task force.

Global Campaigns

The formation of global campaigns is another mechanism used both by international agencies to accomplish their objectives and by civil society organizations to influence global policy processes, especially as related to the normative and rule-creation functions of international organizations and to the promotion of peace and social justice. For example, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Amnesty International, and Oxfam joined together in October 2003 to launch the Control Arms Campaign. The campaign has been working aggressively for a global arms trade treaty. Another global NGO campaign that enjoyed much success was the Baby Food Safety Campaign, spearheaded by the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN). IBFAN joined together the International Organization of Consumers Unions (ICU), the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, and the Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFAC). The campaign was successful in getting the World Health Organization to approve a set of recommended standards for marketing infant formula. Other instructive examples include the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the Global Campaign for Education, and the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. In their detailed analysis of global campaigns, Daphne Josselin and William Wallace concluded that “together with international conferences and summits, such campaigns are contributing to the emergence of common norms and values.”

Parallel Conferencing

Beginning in the early 1970s, NGOs developed the practice of holding separate “parallel” conferences at the same time and in the same general location as UN conferences. One of the earliest such parallel conferences was held in conjunction with the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm in 1972. Although the UNCHE secretariat was proactive in involving
scientific NGOs in conference planning, other NGOs found it difficult to break through the Westphalian wall that surrounded the official conference. Thus they initiated their own conference activities in parallel.26

As UN conferencing grew and evolved, NGO conferences and parallel conferences became a permanent fixture on the multilateral scene. Conference after conference, issue upon issue, transnational NGOs, acting in concert, carved out a political space of their own in an attempt to influence norm- and rule-creating activities of international organizations. The Westphalian order that characterized the UN system was under siege. Civic-based actors were not only knocking at the door and requesting a seat at the table but were also building their own chairs and tables and developing their own rules of the game. Parallel conferencing provided a venue that member state governments could constrain but not control.27

In more recent years, NGOs have been increasingly able to “occupy seats at the table” in the official conferences themselves. This was illustrated at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development:

The summit reflected a new approach to conferencing and to sustainable development more generally. It was a dialogue among major stakeholders from governments, civil society, and the private sector. Instead of concentrating primarily on the production of treaties and other outcome documents, participants focused on the creation of new partnerships to bring additional resources to bear for sustainable development initiatives.28

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) possessed a similar venue with civil society organizations participating in the actual conference decisions.

Partnerships
The new “growth industry” with respect to UN–civil society and private sector engagement is partnership creation and promotion. Such an approach was inherent in the wake ofUNCED. The conference outcome document and plan of action, Agenda 21, specifically called for the integration of ten major groups—NGOs, indigenous peoples, local governments, workers, businesses, scientific communities, farmers, women, children, and youth—in the work of the newly created Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). In the context of this mandate, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) authorized the CSD to bring all 1,400 NGOs represented at the conference into consultative status with the new body. Thus, integrating “major groups” within civil society into decisionmaking was explicitly embedded in CSD’s mandate. In terms of UN jargon, the CSD currently has over 340 “voluntary multi-stakeholder partnerships.”29

In the context of the entire UN system, however, this represents just the tip of a very large iceberg. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and nearly every other operational agency have evolved elaborate systems
of partnerships with NGOs and other diverse elements of civil society. In its 1999 annual report, for example, the World Bank reported that 50 percent of its approved projects were run through NGOs. The Bank argues that such extensive reliance on partnerships makes perfect sense, since NGOs have a comparative advantage in getting the product to the poor. A leading catchphrase of the era has become “multistakeholder” arrangements/partnerships, as evidenced, for example, in the UN-initiated Global Reporting Initiative, Forest Stewardship Council, and Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization.

As reflected in Willetts’s stinging critique, the most controversial aspects of such partnership creation have been public-private partnerships and, most especially, the Global Compact initiated by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Unfortunately, the critique of the Global Compact is all too often conducted on an abstract level and is related to issues of civil society representation regarding UN delegate bodies and not focused on participation—the implications for the effectiveness of UN agencies in fulfilling mandates and dealing with critical global problems. Viewing public-private partnerships in more concrete terms yields a different perspective.

The UN Office for Partnerships (UNOP) facilitates UN relations with the private sector and private foundations. It oversees the UN Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP), which is an autonomous trust fund that manages UN Foundation relations with UN agencies. As of August 2008, the UNFIP–UN Foundation partnership had yielded more than an additional $1 billion in real resources for over 400 UN-agency projects in 123 countries.

Nearly every UN operational agency, however, has developed its own method for involving the private sector as needed. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), for example, partners with the private sector in dealing with humanitarian disasters. The private sector is viewed as being particularly helpful for mobilizing resources rapidly; contributing to relief efforts in sectors that are underresourced, such as agriculture education, health care, and sanitation; providing technical expertise; and assisting with logistics, communications, and the warehousing of goods and equipment. The agency has worked with the International Business Leaders Forum to produce and disseminate a framework for business response for management and planning in case of natural disasters.

Focusing more concretely on the UN’s Global Compact with business reveals some interesting programmatic initiatives. The Global Compact’s least developed country initiative, for example, works to attract private investment for sustainable development and to identify opportunities for local small and medium-sized enterprises in resource-poor countries. The Global Compact has also launched an initiative, Business in Zones of Conflict, designed to provide guidance to the private sector regarding roles that businesses can play in preventing and resolving conflict. In the context of the Global Compact, the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention (on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal) has established a very elaborate and formal public-private partnership program, designed to provide governments and stakeholders with more effective means to collectively address and manage waste streams by tapping expertise and knowledge and leveraging scarce resources beyond those normally available to government bodies, especially at subnational levels. Partnership activities include training; information collection and dissemination; development and utilization of practical tools; and capacity building. This multistakeholder arrangement encompasses actors from industry and business, international institutions, environmental and other nongovernmental organizations, academia, and government at all levels.

The Cardoso Report Reconsidered
Reflecting on Willetts’s critique that the Cardoso Report is intellectually incoherent and displays little understanding of the existing NGO consultative arrangements, it seems a bit harsh to expect a coherent analysis and set of recommendations regarding what is largely a very complex and incoherent phenomenon. Civil society participation in policymaking contains significant aspects of functionalism: UN agencies need and desire NGO expertise. In an environment of declining donor state commitment to providing adequate development financing, new and innovative alternatives are needed to make sustainable development a reality. In order to solve in any sustainable way the kinds of complex social and economic problems that dominate UN agencies’ agendas, those most affected need to be involved in the process. Finally, the UN system is committed to enhancing democratic policymaking, and engaging NGOs in every aspect of the policy process is one way of doing so. The problem is how to reform the UN system in order to accomplish all the above without placing an impossible set of burdens on international civil servants.

The panel offered a number of institutional reform recommendations, but because they were unfortunately left underdeveloped, especially with regard to their implications for established NGO consultative mechanisms and arrangements, they were easy targets of criticism. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the Cardoso panel is but one of the many attempts to think through more thoroughly the question of UN–civil society relations systematically. In 1999, for example, the Global Development Network (GDN), sponsored by the World Bank and other international institutions, brought together over 500 economic policy think tanks to explore ways to improve the capacity of such entities to promote economic development. Participants at this meeting addressed the issue of how UN agencies might best work with the plethora of NGOs that wish to influence and participate in UN policymaking and activities specifically, and how UN agencies can make best use of the potential contributions of the NGOs and how they can coordinate and channel relations with them. They proposed that the transnational research community
serve as a “quality check system . . . vetting NGOs and their worthiness for interaction with the UN.” The group concluded that think tanks could play several main roles in this regard: communicate and translate global values and agreements to regional and local audiences; review international agreements and recommend the formulation of national and regional policy options; convene and build alliances among NGOs and civil society; and educate fledgling NGOs on organizational management, planning, and advocacy.

In the final analysis, it seems that the issue of the democratic deficit in the United Nations and global governance is for many, like Willetts, the core issue. This is inherent in Willetts’s complaint that NGOs have no formal status in the main organs of the UN other than ECOSOC and have no formal status with the Bretton Woods Institutions. But who do NGOs, especially those that operate at the global level and make their presence felt in New York, Geneva, and Washington, represent? Paul Wapner has inferred that, on balance, NGOs may be no less accountable to their constituencies than are most national governments or transnational corporations. Yet, it seems important to always keep in mind that NGOs are interest groups underpinned with particular values and interests that they seek to promote. While some may claim to operate in the best collective interests of all humankind, why should other actors automatically assume any degree of legitimacy in such claims? The Quaker Office at the United Nations, for example, has worked hard to promote norms against child soldiers, weapons proliferation, and violations of human rights. So who or what is the foundation for its legitimacy and from where does its authority to act emanate? The answer, of course, is the set of values and normative convictions on which it operates. Yet, in a multicultural world, is that enough?

The increasing use of collaborative networks has raised accountability issues. Ruggie addresses this issue in two parts: “accountable for what?” and “accountable to whom?” In terms of the “for what” criterion, Ruggie argues that networks are not normally rule based and can only be managed for results. With regard to “accountable to whom,” he offers that participants in multi-stakeholder partnerships may not be, strictly speaking, accountable to anyone but themselves. For example, some NGOs are large membership organizations with transparent governance structures and funding sources, but many others are not.

To what extent does a focus on integrating NGOs into global governance represent cultural bias toward Western liberal ideology? For example, in their edited volume on the role of donor funding of civil society organizations for democratic promotion, Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers and their colleagues raise serious questions about the impacts of such practices. They go as far as to suggest that such external civil society aid may actually undermine the legitimacy of the organizations the donors are trying to promote, because “the kinds of NGOs that donors most often select to support are generally not
organizations representing a genuine constituency.” These NGOs can only speak “on behalf of” but not “for” the constituencies they claim to represent. Moreover, the case studies in this volume illustrate how, especially in the Islamic world and Africa, those types of civil society groups that are most influential in society—professional associations and ethnic and religious groups—are systematically bypassed by major donors (especially the United States). “The organizations . . . [that donor funding] helps call into being and develop are the creations of donor funding rather than of social demands for representation and a role in policy-making.”

So, in this sober light, what is the answer to the question: What is the value added by bringing civil society, the private sector, and other elements of world society more fully into global policy processes? Well, the answer may or may not be increased democratization of global governance processes, but it is clearly the enhancement of global policy processes in terms of increasing the capacity and competence of international organizations for fulfilling critically important information, normative, rule-creating, rule-supervising, and operational functions. NGOs, other civil society organizations, subnational governance institutions, and the private sector indeed provide much needed value added but also represent good value for the money in coping with the myriad problems confronting humankind in the early twenty-first century.

Each of the categories of “constituencies,” as the Cardoso Report puts it, brings with it disadvantages as well as advantages, constraints as well as capabilities, and costs as well as benefits. As the World Commission on Global Governance cautioned, engaging with a more diverse range of civil society actors means that international civil servants and governments alike are forced to deal with a broader range of interests and operating styles. This, I believe, is more of a virtue than a cost. It reflects more closely the complex world in which international programs, projects, and policies must be carried out.

But still, strong voices ask: Why include the private sector? Of course there are numerous arguments for both excluding and including the private sector in our discussion of UN–civil society partnerships despite the fact that we may not want technically to include it in the definition of civil society. Consider, for example, the first Global Compact rationalization offered by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In essence, the aim of this program is to garner wider support for the protection of international norms and standards by bringing international business “inside.” The globalizing world of market expansion has led to a growing imbalance in the ability to enforce various kinds of international norms. While substantial progress has been made in globalizing and integrating free-trade and other liberal economic norms into domestic settings, much less movement has occurred in the area of promoting social norms related to such economic processes as human rights, labor standards, and environmental protection. To help redress such an imbalance, Annan proposed a partnership involving the private sector, NGOs, and international
agencies—the “global compact.” In this compact, corporations were asked to embrace and support nine international principles, drawn from UN human rights, labor, and environmental legal instruments, and accordingly to embrace related “good practices.”

As John Holmes reminded us many years ago, much if not most of the real governance in the world through which values become authoritatively allocated is in reality done by private sector institutions and entities. This is part and parcel of the grand compromise/synthesis on which the post–World War II world order has been based—the liberal melding of the Westphalian-interstate order with the capitalist world economy. The UN system was from its inception an amalgamation of these two perceived disparate systems. While the international institutions established were to be based on states and the unit of membership (with all the legal fictions that accompany the concept), the allocation of values within the world politic was to be largely managed by the “invisible hand” of private sector operations, over which the governments of states should place minimalist constraints. Liberal democracy called for civil and political equality as a fundamental principle, while at the same time liberal economics, which serves as de facto political allocator, enshrines inequality as a guiding principle.

Although the Global Compact was a grand scheme, it was not ill conceived. Its creators understood well the nature of the complex interdependent and holistic organic world in which the UN operates. Empowering people for sustainable human security requires providing sustainable livelihoods. It requires empowerment. Empowering people with ideas without providing them with political economic empowerment is a path to conflict, not cooperation. Human rights and democratic ideals are hollow without social and economic security. Is freedom to be constantly hungry, to be malnourished, to live in abject poverty, to live without safe drinking water or adequate sanitation, or to allow all the above to be determined by the invisible hand of supply and demand really freedom? Continuing to operate in a schizophrenic manner that endeavors to promote better governance while at the same time ignoring and excluding from engagement those kinds of forces, as suggested by John Holmes, that have the greatest effect on global, transnational, and national allocation processes seems to some foolhardy. Inclusion of NGOs and other elements of traditionally conceived civil society is not enough. In the words of the Cardoso Report, “Civil society is now so vital to the United Nations that engaging with it well is a necessity, not an option. It must also engage with others, including the private sector, parliaments and local authorities.”

In conclusion, as Holmes suggested, effective multilateral diplomacy requires something like “synchronized diplomacy.” In a globalizing, highly complex, interdependent world, successful global policy requires that all the instruments and performers necessary for producing harmonious outcomes be engaged constructively in the symphony. Important constructive change has
been afoot in the UN system. But the change has been in function, the function of the organic UN, not in form, the form of the “first UN,” which remains highly resistant to meaningful reform.

Notes
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4. Ibid., pp. 8–9.

5. Ibid., p. 9.


12. Ibid., p. 12.

13. Ibid., pp. 9-10.


15. Ibid., p. 306.
21. Weiss and Gordenker, *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*, p. 367.
23. See www.controlarms.org/.
27. Coate, “Civil Society as a Force for Peace.”
28. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 124.
36. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ottaway and Carothers, *Funding Virtue*, p. 82.