

The Further Design of International Secretariats by Frontierspersons

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This exploratory paper looks at the creation of international organizations. It does not start from the states that set up organizations but from the biographical literature on executive heads. It focuses on the roles of the first executive heads who set up the bureaucracy, or international secretariat, and launch the organization's first activities and policy processes. The first section of the paper discusses ideas about the further design of organizations after the signing of the constitution in conjunction with the fact that in the constitutions relatively little is written about the secretariat and its staff. It then refers to the IO BIO Project, which has published entries with short life and career descriptions of 22 first executive heads, also called frontierspersons. The next section examines two executive heads of nineteenth-century international organizations, five heads from the League of Nations System, twelve heads from the United Nations System and three more heads of some non-UN organizations and is followed by a conclusion about the further design of these international organizations.

Further Design

When states create intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), they try to remain in control of the new organization (or agent, in principal-agent terminology). Negotiation results between governments are carefully written down in the constitution. It is assumed that precise wordings in the constitution, particularly the description of the organization's objectives, fields of activity and powers of the organs, as well as certain organs themselves (such as the governing board) guarantee continued state control of the new organization. This firm realist assumption (Mearsheimer 1994-1995) contrasts with the general fact that the founding states of IGOs have not been strongly inclined to give precise and detailed instructions for the secretariat and its staff in the constitutions. Sections and articles on secretariats, executive heads and staff are relatively short and undetailed (see for instance Article VI of the League of Nations Covenant, with five short paragraphs, and Articles 97-101 of Chapter XV of the United Nations Charter, with eight short paragraphs).

This contradiction raises the question of when the design of IGOs actually ends. Does it stop with the signing and/or ratification of the constitution or does it continue after that? Preparations for the functioning of certain organizations sometimes start before the constitution will be ratified by the required number of parties, simply because the organization's work has to be set in motion. Interim organs are set up in those cases. Generally speaking, however, the task of elaborating the organization based on the agreed-upon constitution is left to the executive head and her/his initial senior staff, while the main negotiators of the constitution return to the pressing issues waiting in domestic politics and leave it to a few national civil servants in the ministry of foreign affairs to follow the IGO's further organizational development and activities, which suggests that this later oversight is less strict than during the original negotiations. Principal-agent theory recognizes that the agent may develop some independent action. Agency slack in the form of slippage refers to a situation where an agent shifts policy away from its principal's preferred outcomes toward its own preferences. Given the fact that constitutional instructions for the secretariat and staff are not detailed, it may be expected that slippage emerges already in the early stage of elaborating the secretariat (the only permanent organ) and setting into motion the required organizational processes.

Legal theory also allows room for manoeuvre through its idea of an organization's distinct will (*volonté distincte*). The distinct will starts to present itself when 'the organization, through its administrative organ, not only executes tasks set by the member states, but at the very least helps to shape those tasks and helps to select amongst the tasks' (Klabbers 2015: 71-72). The secretariat is often seen as an administrative organ, which needs to take care of practical matters, but reality shows further practices which include preparing meetings, establishing agendas and preparing the budget. Here too it may be assumed that this starts at the very beginning of the organization's existence. Another legal idea, that of 'incomplete contracts', refers to the fact that agreements may be incomplete, uncertain or vague, or even contradictory. It can be expected that, when executive heads and their staff meet with such incomplete or contradictory elements of the constitution and other documents related to the organization's founding process, they will try to solve these, either from the perspective of expertise in the field of their IGO or from a managerial perspective; hence, also at a very early moment in the organization's history.

The actual setting up of international secretariats and other organs of IGOs has not received much scholarly attention. The same goes for the bureaucracy of IGOs more generally (Davies 2002: xviii) as well as the careers and performance of executive heads of IGOs. The IO BIO Project, or *Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations* (see *IO BIO*), discerns among executive heads between so-called frontierspersons, reformers and regulars. Similar to the idea of American settlers who had just come to live on the edge of what they regarded unclaimed territory, the individuals who start as the first executive head of an IGO may be viewed as 'frontierspersons'. They are mapping the unclaimed international issue area and are tasked with building up the organization's administrative machinery, based on a constitution drawn up by the founding states, followed by a phase in which the organization develops its first activities and policy making. Generally speaking, at this early moment there are still many things that have to be arranged and decided upon. Maurice Hankey and Eric Drummond, for instance, had quite different ideas about the structure and functioning of the League of Nations Secretariat after the Versailles peace treaty had been concluded. 'Reformers' are those executive heads who are selected, based on the assumption that they understand the reform demands that have been formulated by various actors, and generate ideas and policies to reform the organization accordingly. A third intermediate category are 'regulars', or executive heads who function in established organizations, not being the ones who set up the organization or are supposed to reform it.

In international relations theory there is a general tendency to leave personal factors as well as the role of individuals out of the analysis. However, individual leadership matters in several circumstances, such as decision making in crisis situations and during international bargaining when negotiations should be brought to a successful end. Regime theory promoted the idea of several types of political leadership, among these entrepreneurial leadership, in which individual capacities do matter (Young 1991). Individual leadership may matter at all moments, including when an IGO starts to function. The IO BIO Project developed the assumption that in order to play a significant role in international relations executive heads of IGOs must combine strong internal and strong external leadership capacities. Those heads who show only internal, or only external, leadership will prove to be unsuccessful leaders of their IGO in the end. Those showing both internal and external leadership are called 'combiners'.

Internal leadership refers to hierarchical relations and a range of layers of management responsibilities within the secretariat. Among the required management capacities are hiring competent staff members; directing staff work in line with the organization's principles and policy directions as set by the executive head and the IGO's decision-making organs; finding resources for the activities the organization wants to undertake; the ability to use the assets an organization has available (e.g. in the form of expertise); and keeping track of what is going on

and needs to be done within the organization, which includes both delegation and coordination capacities as well as the capacity to motivate staff to work in favour of the organization's objectives. Internal leadership requires a conscious effort of being present, according to Robert Cox (1969: 229-230), who underlines the executive head's need to maintain him/herself as top person in bureaucratic politics and also prevent segments of the bureaucracy from working against his or her policies. Leadership also implies representation of ideas and strategies of the secretariat within bodies of the organization in which member states are decision makers, such as general assemblies and councils.

External leadership has a strong political character but may emerge because executive heads have certain assets available which help the IGO to acquire more room for manoeuvre from its environment and to play a role of its own in international relations. Such assets are the focused use of its expertise, the identification of enemies and external supporters (such as specific states, other IGOs and non-governmental actors), the documentation for or against certain arguments and the exploration of alternative policies (Haas 1964; Cox and Jacobson 1973). Among the required capacities for external leadership are an understanding of the international context and its constraints – Cox (1969: 229-230) speaks about the clarity of the executive head's perception of the significance of the prevailing pattern of conflicts and alignments – and the capacity and willingness to actually take the initiative and lead the IGO into a certain direction.

Frontierspersons need to be 'combiners' and need to be extremely good external leaders if environmental conditions are hostile to their visions. Reform of an IGO also requires the combination of internal and external leadership qualities. Both external observers and employees scrutinize the personality, professional credentials and integrity of new heads who are supposed to reform an IGO, but the internal perspective and expectations of staff members may differ from those of external observers (Hanrieder 2015: 143-144).

Whereas (neo)realism has a negative opinion about the quality of executive heads (by portraying them as being mainly interested in the continuity and health of the organization), the quality of the executive heads of IGOs that were set up as commissions and public unions in the nineteenth century was obvious at the time. In order to be appointed they needed to be experts in their field as well as persons of high intellectual and moral standing. That they did have management qualities is revealed by the fact that 80 per cent of these IGOs (41 out of the 51 that existed in 1914) succeeded in surviving the First World War, very much due to leadership in a situation in which international relations were disrupted (Reinalda 2009: 92-93). They also continued their existence in spite of being neglected by the League of Nations. Our knowledge of older IGOs is obscured by the fact that governments who designed new IGOs after major wars portrayed the older IGOs as outdated and having little relevance. This happened in 1919 with the IGOs established during the nineteenth century and it happened again in 1945 with the League of Nations and its specialized agencies. The governments of major powers did so because they wanted to create something new and in line with their philosophies, but they did profit from the experiences of the older organizations and in several cases continued the activities these older organizations had begun (the UN's international court, for instance, continued the work of the League's permanent court). However, these governments also created myths, such as the League's 'failure' and the 'technical' character of older IGOs, which make it more difficult to follow organizational developments and behaviour over time.

A Group of IGO Frontierspersons Described in *IO BIO*

In this paper I want to find out more about the role of frontierspersons or first executive heads in elaborating their organization's secretariat after its foundation. I will use the entries published by *IO BIO*, which are available through public access (at www.ru.nl/fm/iobio). 22 out of almost

80 entries describe frontierspersons. I am not claiming any representativeness here, but the 22 executive heads who happen to have been published in *IO BIO* at this moment cover several periods and fields. I just wonder whether these entries confirm or nuance my expectations about individual leadership in setting up secretariats. Here I restrict myself to information as presented in these entries. Given the focus of the *IO BIO* editors on what executive heads actually do and undertake, assessments in these entries may differ from older evaluations based on the assumption that individual leadership of IOs does not matter that much.

Let me group the 22 organizations and heads in some subsets and describe who are among these frontierspersons. I start with two not very extensively researched IGOs from the nineteenth century, namely the European Danube Commission (with *John Stokes* as the British delegate who as *primus inter pares* assumed the leadership role [1856-71], which includes a discussion about who in this river commission may be seen as executive head) and the International Telegraph Union with *Louis Curchod* as its first and third Director [1869, 1873-89].

The League of Nations group of organizations includes *Eric Drummond* as the League's first Secretary-General [1919-33], *Rachel Crowdy* as Head of the Social Affairs Section [1919-31], *Fridtjof Nansen* as High Commissioner for Refugees [1921-30], *Ludwik Rajchman* as Director of the Health Organization (1921-39) and *James McDonald* as High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany [1933-35] (although this position may also be seen as one in the extension of the Nansen office).

The United Nations system includes *Trygve Lie* as the first UN Secretary-General [1945-53] and *Gunnar Myrdal* as the first Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe [1947-57]. The specialized agencies are represented by UNESCO, with *Julian Huxley* as Director-General [1946-48], UNICEF with Executive Director *Maurice Pate* [1947-65], the World Health Organization with Director-General *Brock Chisholm* [1948-53], the UN High Commissioner for Refugees with *Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart* [1951-56] as well as the UN Technical Assistance Administration with Director-General *Hugh Keenleyside* [1950-58] and the UN Special Fund and the UN Development Programme with *Paul Hoffman* as the Special Fund's Managing Director [1959-65] and the UNDP's Administrator [1966-72]. Among the 'related organizations' are, in the economic sphere, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development with President *Eugene Meyer* [1946] and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with Executive Secretary, later Director-General *Eric Wyndham White* [1948-68] and, in the security sphere, the International Atomic Energy Agency with Director General *Sterling Cole* [1957-61] and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with Director-General *José Bustani* [1997-2002].

Finally, there are some non-UN organizations such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation with Secretary-General *Robert Marjolin* [1948-55], the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development with Secretary-General *Thorkil Kristensen* [1961-69] (although he could also be seen as 'reformer', as the OECD continued the OEEC in many respects) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with Secretary General *Lord Ismay* [1952-57].

The Nineteenth Century

Who can be seen as the first executive head of the European Danube Commission, which had seven equivalent commissioners of the signatory powers at the 1856 Paris Peace Treaty as its executive committee? The Commission also had a clerical staff with a 'secretary-general', but at the time this secretary-general cannot be considered to be the IGO's executive head. British delegate *John Stokes*, however, became the informal leader of the collegial institution and its bureaucracy, based on Britain's position as hegemon and its leading role in Danubian trade as well as Stokes' seniority and everyday leadership. He was appointed to the Commission for his

engineering background and developed into a qualified expert in the navigation of transboundary waterways, but also built a solid understanding of the juridical and administrative aspects of inland navigation. The Commission under his guidance drafted legislation in a manner which accommodated Ottoman law, the privileges of foreign citizens in the Ottoman empire and their own legislation. This encouraged a great degree of cooperation at a pan-European level and implied an information exchange with governments, private companies and academics around Europe. Stokes also played a role in prolonging the temporary IGO by convincing the British government of the organization's relevance. The entry in *IO BIO*, written by Constantin Ardeleanu, shows that Stokes, the only fully paid Commissioner, was a strong leader, both internally and externally, hence, a 'combiner'. It also shows that this 'executive head' did elaborate the organization of the European Danube Commission.

Louis Curchod of the International Telegraph Union was another engineer and prominent expert, in his case in international telegraphy, who showed strong organizational leadership. He played a role in establishing the ITU and was a pivotal figure in the establishment of a central secretariat, which was not mentioned in the constitution. Curchod set up a close collaboration with the administrative secretary but resigned by the end of his first year, because he could not do what he needed to do with the salary the Swiss government paid him. This was smaller than what the ITU founders had recommended but, according to the Swiss government, sufficient. However, Curchod returned after a few years (with a higher salary) and proposed and obtained faster proceedings (including voting procedures and procedures for approval of conference texts), which stabilized the organization and enhanced the secretariat's position, in spite of the Swiss government's strong oversight role. Curchod set up a regular correspondence with 37 national administrations and in fact managed the international telegraph network, using extensive studies in his contacts with governments. The entry in *IO BIO*, written by Simone Fari and Gabriele Balbi, shows that he also was a 'combiner' and someone who made the organization and its secretariat more self-directing than what the founders, particularly Switzerland, had had in mind.

The League of Nations System

Eric Drummond, mentioned as the first Secretary-General in the Annex to the League's Covenant, was a British civil servant who was attached to the delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Unlike the war council model preferred by Maurice Hankey, Drummond developed the model of an 'international secretariat', with international civil servants working for the organization (instead of their countries of origin) and being paid by it. However, his British Foreign Office traditions included privileges for the major powers. Another restriction to this international principle was that senior staff recruited staff of their own nationality, resulting in 'national islands'. Drummond proved to be a skilful administrative head, who set up a small team of young and capable men and women to develop the new international civil service and he made the secretary-generalship a vital international office. He saw the League as a useful framework for negotiation, mediation and information exchange. He was open-minded, knew how to delegate, giving much latitude to section directors, but was unapproachable by lower echelons. Karen Gram-Skjoldager, the author of the *IO BIO* entry, regards him as a resourceful, cautious and discrete diplomat, who wanted cordial relations with the great powers and expanded membership to include major powers outside the organization. He made the League an entity separate from the Allies and capable of setting its own course. He adopted a restrained, evolutionary approach to his work, gradually demonstrating and expanding the League's authority, helping governments brokering political compromise and adjusting his course to find common solutions, preferring discretion over a role in public opinion. Drummond obviously 'combined' internal and external leadership and was, as is now

receiving more attention (Mazower 2012), the founder of the first major international civil service, with an impact on later international public administration.

Drummond appointed *Rachel Crowdy*, a British nurse and dispensing chemist who organized medical facilities in France during the First World War, because he needed someone capable of leading the League's social projects. She was a determined person, who became the League's most senior female civil servant, though given the title of 'Head' of Social Affairs instead of 'Director' (like her male colleagues). She extended her section to also include health and opium traffic, liaised with international NGOs, provided the League with a new kind of liaison with governments and NGOs. She helped build up international professional networks, generated a new model of international policy development and promoted international conventions on traffic in women and children and opium. She warned against the trend that the Secretariat began to replace women by men by the late 1920s. According to Martyn Housden's entry in *IO BIO*, she 'combined' internal and external leadership, elaborated her own section into an independent entity, though still part of the League's Secretariat, and helped to create the Health Organization out of it.

Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian scientist and diplomat, was asked by the League's Secretariat (an initiative by Drummond and Philip Noel-Baker) to set up relief plans for German and Russian prisoners of war and to expediate the repatriation of the two groups. The work included coordination of the work by NGOs, mediation between ex-enemies, including a visit to Bolshevik Moscow, and complex financial schemes. Given the ongoing problem of refugees and displaced persons, Nansen obtained the title of High Commissioner for Refugees. The League, however, did not create a body and gave him a (renewable) mandate for one year, while the member states' interest in displaced persons was waning. Nansen's work in the fight against the famine in Russia (which he did outside the League) brought him the Nobel Peace Prize. His main work remained the refugee question (such as after the Greco-Turkish war), where he proved a centralizing element of governmental and private actions by collecting data, converging initiatives, lobbying and negotiating, not to mention the need to find resources. He set up an advisory committee for private organizations, established a document of identification that became known as 'Nansen passport', and cooperated with the ILO in order to find work for refugees, a form of boundary spanning. In 1929, just before Nansen's death, the service was brought under the authority of the League's Secretary-General and incorporated into the Secretariat, which weakened the work essentially. According to Francesca Piana's entry in *IO BIO*, Nansen was the person who elaborated the League's humanitarian work and became its public face. He was a 'combiner' of internal and external leadership.

Being a 'combiner' cannot be said of *James McDonald*, the League's High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany – in fact a new institution. This US foreign policy expert with sympathy for Germany, however, had a weak relationship with the League (and was also side-lined by Secretary-General Joseph Avenol), had few resources and his policy to put pressure on Nazi Germany was not followed by politicians. Hence, both his internal and external leadership was weak and after two years he resigned when he noticed there was no more he could do (see my entry in *IO BIO*).

Given the epidemics in Central and Eastern Europe and the refusal by the older International Office of Public Health to cooperate with the League, the League Secretariat decided to establish a temporary Epidemics Commission. The League then created its own Health Organization. Crowdy proposed Polish medical doctor *Ludwik Rajchman* to Drummond, who appointed Rajchman as its Director. Rajchman used Nansen's contacts in Moscow and succeeded in handling the difficult relations between France, Germany and Russia and in controlling the epidemics. He also reached out to the Far East and established a Bureau in Singapore. He noticed the excellent quality of Japan's public health and the absence of public health services in China. This resulted in cooperation with China in the fields of health and also

economic development, but due to political developments Rajchman's room for manoeuvre decreased during the 1930s. Rajchman elaborated the section of the League's Secretariat into a self-directing organization. He had many ideas and initiatives, managed to get funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, set up a global database for sanitary statistics, added the new science of nutrition and often went beyond his budget and managed to solve the problems. Marta Balinska's entry in *IO BIO* shows that Rajchman combined internal and external leadership until Secretary-General Avenol dissolved his directorate in 1939. During the war Rajchman continued his work in China and for the Allied states, suggesting a United Nations Health Service in 1943 and initiating UNICEF in 1946 by using UNRRA residual funds to help children.

The United Nations System

The appointment of Norwegian politician *Trygve Lie* as the first UN Secretary-General was unexpected, which left him no time for preparation. However, he wanted to make the UN a success and focused on consolidating and expanding the political powers of his office. His first legal memorandum changed the Security Council's rules of procedures and he took advantage of crises to expand the powers of his office and gain recognition for his political role, such as his right to establish investigative committees, draft resolutions, appoint special representatives and delegate his authority to them (not mentioned in the Charter), propose solutions, coordinate activities and initiate activities to implement UN decisions. He issued a public statement over the Berlin Blockade together with the General Assembly president and, in order to establish personal relations, embarked on a 27-day tour of major capitals plus UN offices in Europe, thus creating precedents for an activist role for the Secretary-General, according to Ellen Ravndal and Jim Muldoon in their *IO BIO* entry. But he lost the Soviet Union's support through his role in the Korean War. The UN's bureaucratic office had to be set up in a short time. Lie presided over important administrative developments, leaving recruitment and running the Secretariat to his staff, and succeeded in establishing the UN headquarter buildings in New York. In the early days many staff members were British and American and governments refused to assist in screening potential staff. Pressurized by the US government against the McCarthy background, Lie made the mistake of allowing the FBI to enter UN premises to interview US nationals about potential Communist sympathies. Lie thus betrayed Article 100 on the Secretariat's international and independent character, which resulted in tensions with his staff as well as his resignation. In spite of political shortcomings in both his internal and external leadership, he succeeded in carving out a space for an active and expansionist UN Secretary-General and established a number of precedents for his successors to build on, according to Ravndal and Muldoon.

The Swedish economist *Gunnar Myrdal* was appointed by Lie as Executive Secretary of the UN's first regional commission to be created by the UN Economic and Social Council. Lie looked for someone able to navigate between East and West. That the temporary ECE became a permanent body resulted from the dynamic action of Myrdal, who tried to make the ECE Secretariat an independent and scientifically based body. He recruited a small team of outstanding and hardworking staff, named a Soviet citizen as his deputy and made Russian an official language, together with French and English. He established the *Economic Survey of Europe* and denied governments the right to modify the report. Myrdal saw facts as the greatest persuaders and repeatedly confronted governments with facts, no matter how unpleasant these might be, according to Chloé Maurel in her entry in *IO BIO*. He succeeded in maintaining a highly objective atmosphere within the organization, which shows internal leadership during ten years of Cold War. Through his wife he cooperated with UNESCO and participated in the UN debate on race. With a focus on practical matters, he set up agreements and standards in technical affairs, adopting a middle way between the neoclassical approach and the communist

view of economics by promoting social reforms and the welfare state, which shows external leadership. Although the ECE was not set up by states, Myrdal elaborated the organization, which included receiving US support for appointing a Soviet deputy. The ECE was weakened by the creation of the OEEC.

The British scientist *Julian Huxley* was the Executive Secretary of the UNESCO Preparatory Commission and became UNESCO's first Director-General. Hostility from US conservative circles resulted in a secret agreement that he would resign after two years plus the appointment of a US deputy, who restricted his power, and a limited budget. Huxley was an eccentric personality with poor administrative skills. Administration caused him headaches. However, he developed original ideas as a visionary person and recruited good staff members. He brought a passionate atmosphere to the Secretariat which resulted in enthusiasm for the work. He showed an early concern for problems of 'underdeveloped' areas in the world and for conservation of nature, but he also created problems when presenting his eugenic ideas against the will of his advisers. Although the creator of the fine pioneer spirit, he was not a 'combiner' (also politically restricted) and weak in his external leadership.

Rajchman, UNICEF's initiator, persuaded Lie to appoint US businessman *Maurice Pate* as UNICEF's first Executive Secretary. Pate accepted the position on the condition of no discrimination against children of any nationality. He furthermore demanded a clear line of authority from the UN Secretary-General and a free hand in the choice of his staff and in directing UNICEF's activities. He regarded voluntary funding as positive, as this forced him and his staff to come up with innovative ways for raising money (such as goodwill ambassadors). Four UN specialized agencies and the US government opposed to UNICEF's existence and extension, but the devotion and efficiency of Pate and his staff made it a permanent and worldwide organization, with Pate responding quickly to requests in crises such as Hungary 1956 and Congo 1960. Using surveys on the needs of children, Pate transformed UNICEF from a humanitarian institution into a development one. Pate, a 'combiner', elaborated the organization, succeeded in making it permanent and he transformed it when he feared it had lost its uniqueness, according to Michael Schechter in his *IO BIO* entry.

Canadian military *Brock Chisholm* was elected as Executive Secretary of the Interim Commission which eventually became the WHO. He lacked experience in the three older health organizations but acted as visionary supporter of a new worldwide organization. The new organization should have regional offices and absorb the Pan-American PAHO. The Interim Commission lasted longer than planned but this enhanced Chisholm's international stature. Chisholm, who had the support of the Commonwealth countries and came from a middle power, favoured an independent WHO. He emphasized that international civil servants should behave as world citizens and not as national representatives. He influenced the constitution, established the organization, staffed it with competent people and organized its bureaucracy, working with loyal colleagues, and was seen as a highly moral personality. He handled the outbreak of cholera in Egypt successfully, but had to fight against member states in favour of national positions. He successfully fought against a Canada-led group of states that wanted to amend the WHO constitution in order to have Executive Board members serve on a governmental, and not a personal, basis. However, he lost on three other issues: the withdrawal of the Soviet bloc countries (but he listed them as non-active members which enabled their smooth return), the issue of decentralization (PAHO did not integrate into the WHO) and the organization's medical approach. Being in favour of the social medicine approach, he had to give in to the narrower biomedical approach led by the US. He furthermore clashed with the Catholic Church on family planning and saw the issue removed from the agenda. Given severe budgetary and political constraints, Chisholm had little room for manoeuvre. His outspokenness enabled him to publicize his ideas but this did not bring him political support. Eventually he grew frustrated with not being able to impose his views and retired early. Although he was a visionary leader

with regard to establishing the WHO, he did not succeed in leading it as an independent organization, since he had to yield to member-states, which decided on significant orientations, according to Auriane Guilbaud in her *IO BIO* entry. Hence a weak ‘combiner’, with his internal leadership stronger than his external one.

Dutch politician *Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart* was a delegate to several UN gatherings and oversaw the creation of the office of the UNHCR as chair of the General Assembly’s Third Committee. The US regarded the UNHCR as a sideshow and did not succeed in having the High Commissioner appointed by the UN Secretary-General or in having its own candidate chosen. Van Heuven Goedhart had a three-year mandate, met with strong US opposition and had a lack of resources. He hence looked for funding elsewhere, such as the Rockefeller Foundation for a scientific survey that gave him insights in the situation. He furthermore used his contacts with the Dutch royal family and Eleanor Roosevelt to have the UN set up an emergency fund and he received money from the Ford Foundation. His invention of the Nansen Award (awarded to Queen Juliana and Roosevelt) drew public attention to his work. He met with a strong interagency controversy with the US-supported International Refugee Organization and the US setting up several separate organizations such as UNRWA (Palestine refugees), UNKRA (Korean ones), as well as ICEM and USEP (non-UN organizations for migration from Europe). He also met with competition from the ILO. Van Heuven Goedhart, however, managed these tensions and his awareness of the refugee situation during the Berlin crisis of 1953, with large numbers of people fleeing from East Germany, caused a successful UNHCR intervention. He succeeded in receiving sufficient political support and in creating practical solutions, such as building prefab houses by engaging a German architect. This resulted in a more positive US attitude toward the UNHCR, a renewal of his mandate with another five years and his reappointment. He suddenly passed away but was described as an example for his staff and a very good political fighter, who managed to elaborate the marginalized UNHCR and turn it into a relevant actor. Obviously a ‘combiner’ (see the *IO BIO* entry by Jeroen Corduener and myself).

Canadian diplomat *Hugh Keenleyside* brought diplomatic and administrative experience with him and a reputation for dynamism and managerial skill. Lie appointed him for the Technical Assistance Administration within the UN Secretariat. Keenleyside took a low profile, given US and Soviet suspicion, but showed an operational and managerial leadership style, with a clear vision on helping Southern countries to write and implement national development plans. The TAA became one of the few operational units of the UN Secretariat, which, however, was dependent on the UN Secretary-General (more autonomy under Lie than under Hammarskjöld, who backed technical assistance but did not see a separate agency as vital) and it had limited (voluntary) funding. The agency and its leader (1950-58) are mostly forgotten, but they allowed the UN to position itself as a primary actor in global economics and to enhance the aspirations of developing countries, according to David Webster in his *IO BIO* entry.

US business man and administrator of the European Recovery Program *Paul Hoffman* played an instrumental role in setting up the UN Special Fund in 1958, as a successor to SUNFED and a complement to EPTA. Given the strong US opposition to these earlier UN institutions, Hoffman orchestrated a compromise establishment and set up a working relationship with the IBRD. The Fund became a semi-autonomous UN agency, not an operating one, but one that raised money which then farmed out the actual work to one of the specialized agencies. Hoffman as its Managing Director focused on soliciting contributions and on top-level negotiations, leaving the management of operations to his chief assistants. Hoffman’s close connections to the private sector were exceptional for the UN at the time. As a result of the merger of EPTA and the Special Fund in 1965, Hoffman became the Administrator (his preference for this title) of the UN Development Programme. He built the UNDP from scratch and created its network of field resident representatives. Projects being implemented too

speedily with insufficient monitoring became severe criticisms. Robert Jackson investigated the complaints and placed most of the blame on top-heavy and misdirected administration. Hoffman felt the report was unfair but declared that the UNDP would act on some of the recommendations. His position however had become untenable and the UN Secretariat under U Thant announced that he would retire (see his entry by Michael Schechter in *IO BIO*). A ‘combiner’ with decentralized internal leadership and centralized external leadership, which after a while resulted in a misdirected administration.

Among the UN ‘related organizations’ is the IBRD with American financier *Eugene Meyer* as its first President. He was asked to launch the IBRD by the US government but, once in function, he met with sharp disagreements with the executive directors over procedures and the president’s authority. Meyer established the research department and recruited senior staff and distanced the IBRD from the UN. However, the executive directors set their own policy. Meyer resigned, feeling too old to fight the bastards (see his entry by Michael Schechter in *IO BIO*). Obviously weak in his internal leadership.

British civil servant *Eric Wyndham White* was the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, with the Havana conference finalizing the ITO Charter. When the US did not ratify, the ITO did not come into being and the GATT was left as a provisional agreement. Wyndham White stayed on as Executive Secretary and then built up the infrastructure, mandate and legitimacy of an accidental organization. He had a small but skillful staff. The Secretariat initiated and regularized meetings of contracting parties, widening the mandate and preparing for new rounds of tariff negotiations. He had to explain and defend the work of the GATT all the time, but by the 1960s the GATT became a de facto international organization. In 1960 a Permanent Council was set up and in 1968 the GATT had its own permanent residence. Wyndham White was in charge of several rounds of tariff negotiations, which may not be a customary role for an Executive Secretary. He succeeded in doing this but needed all of his skills in conflict resolution as well as patience in brokering disputes, according to Francine McKenzie in her *IO BIO* entry. His success was double-edged, as the organization also was the target for opponents of freer world trade. He took criticisms by the developing world seriously, set up the International Trade Centre in 1964, drafted a new GATT Chapter on development and defended GATT policies at UNCTAD’s first meeting. In 1965 his title was changed to Director-General. When looking for someone who actually built an organization from scrap after 1945, it may be Wyndham White, who combined internal and external leadership during twenty years.

American politician *Sterling Cole* was a US delegation member to the conference that drafted the IAEA statute in 1956. His appointment as Director General met with some resistance as he was not a scientist from a neutral country. Cole and the IAEA started slowly, focusing on hiring staff and making governments aware of its existence. Cole had little experience in administration or diplomacy and his temper could flare. His stubbornness gave him the nickname Stub. Relations with the Board were not smooth due to Cold War relations, with the US government preferring bilateral and regional arrangements rather than the global ones that the IAEA was established to administer. It also believed that Cole gave the Soviets too much influence. The projects Cole started were too costly and the high salary he demanded annoyed economy-minded delegations. Given his impatience with protocol, diplomatic conventions and political consensus building, there was strong opposition to a second term. Credits for what the IAEA achieved in this early period were given to his deputies, according to Michael Schechter in his *IO BIO* entry. Cole was not a combiner and weak in both forms of leadership.

The Brazilian government promoted the candidacy of its diplomat with long-term UN experience, *José Bustani*, as Director-General of the OPCW. He attended the meetings of the Preparatory Committee, was elected in 1997 and, following a US proposal, re-elected in 2000. Bustani looked after effective relations between the Secretariat and the member states,

promoted universal membership and ensured that all states could be heard and would be equally represented. He opposed the idea of ascribing different roles within the organization to member states, based on their financial contributions (as was done in the Non-Proliferation Treaty). He established the organizational culture by setting political standards and legal procedures, including a code of conduct for OPCW inspectors, motivated by the founding principles of the organization rather than the orientation and interests of powerful member states. Bustani developed a practice of coordinating activities with the UN (the OPCW is not a UN agency). This resulted in 2000 in a relationship agreement (which was used in 2013 in a mission to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons). He promoted international cooperation programmes for peaceful use of chemical technology, especially for developing countries and increased the number of signatories (from 87 to 145), as that would contribute to the organization's greater effectiveness. He insisted that no member states should hamper inspections and did include the US, which nonetheless placed obstacles. This all looked promising, but after the election of US President G.W. Bush Bustani proposed to admit Iraq to the OPCW and send inspectors there. This was rejected by Under-Secretary John Bolton and resulted in Bustani's removal from office in a procedure that proved unlawful and invalid, according to the ILO Administrative Tribunal (his appeal created jurisprudence). See his *IO BIO* entry by Dawisson Belém Lopes. Although Bustani can be seen as a 'combiner' with a strong record of internal and external leadership as well as the one who elaborated the organization in a specific way, the change of US foreign policy ended his executive leadership abruptly.

Some Non-UN International Organizations

French civil servant *Robert Marjolin* spent the war years in London and Washington DC, where he assisted Jean Monnet, who was put in charge of French postwar planning of food and raw materials by General de Gaulle. Following the announcement of the US Marshall Plan, he was engaged in the preparations of the OEEC and became its Secretary-General, seeing the organization as an opportunity to strengthen European efforts toward economic collaboration. He collaborated with the US administration, but also strove to increase the OEEC's autonomy from the US and its member states. His staff policy included the approval of governments to hire new personnel, but once they had joined the organization, he considered himself to be independent in his decisions concerning staff. This strengthened the autonomy of the Secretariat vis-à-vis the member states. Marjolin negotiated with US Congressmen about long-term planning. He helped member states to standardize their national income data and to enhance their statistical production. He created the European Payment Union, which made European payments multilateral. The European Productivity Agency was the work of Alexander King. When military efforts were increased, this caused debate about NATO versus OEEC. Marjolin believed that the military effort was necessary but wanted to keep his economic expertise in order to underline the importance of sustained economic growth and monetary stability, which resulted in collaboration between OEEC and NATO (see his entry written by Alix Heiniger in *IO BIO*). He can be seen as a 'combiner'.

Danish politician *Thorkil Kristensen* was Secretary-General of the OEEC when it was in an organizational crisis in a period with changing Cold War dynamics and the process of decolonization growing. He was selected as the least problematic person to set up a new organization and could also be seen as a 'reformer'. The OECD had to boost Western economic growth in order to keep ahead of the faster growing Soviet Union and it had to bind the emerging South to the West through a capitalist growth path financed by development aid. Kristensen withstood US pressure to have collective growth targets, which he believed were based on unrealistic forecasts and would result in inflation. He also did not want to endanger the expert reputation of the organization through an openly political Cold War initiative. He had to break into a field occupied by other international organizations and succeeded in navigating the varied

coalitions of member states. Although he was not an active and energetic leader, he had an impact over time by making the OECD a research-based think tank, according to Matthias Schmelzer in his *IO BIO* entry. Kristensen left room to the various directorates, took care of a continuous increase in resources and staff and established a greater autonomy vis-à-vis member states. Seen as a ‘reformer’, Kristensen managed to adapt the OEEC to the political and economic change that was taking place and to widen it from a European to a global organization. Seen as the ‘frontiersperson’ of the OECD, he managed to establish a new organization, which coordinated Western states among themselves and in relationship with the global South, by keeping the statistical and research facilities of a previous organization. In both cases he proved to be a ‘combiner’.

Lord Ismay, who brought British military and political experience, became NATO’s Secretary General when he was 65 years old. He set out to develop an effective administrative organization, built on the foundation of a genuine international civil service, also shaping the various roles he needed to fulfil: alliance spokesperson, vice-chair of the North Atlantic Council, initiator of ideas, mediator, conciliator, negotiator, administrator and international diplomat. He defined and staffed the various divisions, created the necessary infrastructure (such as airfields and joint production programmes) and succeeded in getting all member states to commit to a long-term military build-up. In favour of military authorities being subordinate to political authorities, he succeeded in establishing procedures with that effect, even if the SACEURs at the time were the dominant leaders in NATO. Ismay had a good relationship with them. He tried to influence world public opinion, although constrained when he did not have a Council mandate. The Suez Crisis, with France and the UK not consulting the alliance, resulted in the appointment of Three Wise Men, whose report called for a strong Secretary General. When Eisenhower criticized the UK’s role in the Suez Crisis in the Security Council, he considered this as not maintaining the organizational unity of purpose. His wife kept him from resigning. His creation of NATO’s organizational structure had a long-lasting impact, be it with serious limitations on his ability to lead the alliance (see Michael Schechter’s entry in *IO BIO*).

Conclusion

Let me discuss the further design of international secretariats by frontierspersons per subset of international organizations. The two IGOs from the nineteenth century did not have permanent secretariats, hence do not yet meet the general definition of IGOs (three, or more, member states, a written constitution and a permanent secretariat). However, the frontierspersons established these secretariats. The European Danube Commission did not have a chair or executive head, as it was a collegial institution. The position of the UK as hegemon, the British delegate being the only one who was fully paid (by the UK) and his everyday leadership (both internally and externally) made him the *primus inter pares* and informal leader. A clerical section existed, but its head (called secretary-general) cannot be seen as the Commission’s executive head, as far as I can see. This situation raises the question of how the secretariat and executive head position of this river commission developed further. The ITU did not have a secretariat at all and it was the frontiersperson who created it and also made it less dependent on the Swiss government. The ITU was set up with the so-called oversight model by one government. The problems of this model for the autonomy of an IGO matter already in this early phase (e.g. Curchod’s low Swiss salary). It therefore may be expected that executive heads of organizations with this model will try to gain more organizational autonomy and, eventually, abolish the model.

When Kent Kille and I investigated the evolvement of international secretariats, executive heads and leadership in inter-organizational relations (IORs), we found that the establishment of the League of Nations and the ensuing evolvement of its auxiliary institutions created a new type of IOR, which, foreshadowing the UN System, can be characterized as a

‘special agency’ relationship between these institutions and the League, even if most of them formally remained League bodies (Reinalda and Kille 2017: 222-223). The bodies analysed in this paper include the League Secretariat (Drummond), the Social Affairs Section (Crowdy), the High Commissioner for Refugees (Nansen) and the Health Organization (Rajchman), with four strong organizational leaders, both internally and externally. Drummond is known for his vision of an ‘international secretariat’. He developed the model and implemented it, though not fully, given the privileged position of the major powers. He nonetheless elaborated the League’s Secretariat in his way. This secretariat model should not remain covered by the myth of the League’s ‘failure’, but rather be seen as the first major international service, which in many respects laid the foundation of the UN Secretariat and many other international secretariats. His external leadership was focused on demonstrating and expanding the League’s authority. This role should receive more attention, rather than the usual complaint about his absence in public opinion. While social affairs such as traffic in women and in opium as well as health had a weak reference in the League’s Covenant (Article XXIII, added on British request at the last moment), the Covenant did not mention the repatriation of prisoners of war or refugees. What we see, however, is that the Secretariat is not afraid of taking initiatives in these fields and setting up separate sections, which soon evolve as separate institutions, also replacing the term ‘section’ by ‘organization’. This evolution was effectively promoted by their leaders, who all had organizational and entrepreneurial capacities, expertise in their field (Nansen may have been a neophyte in humanitarian action but he learned quickly), an awareness of working for the League of Nations’ values and objectives, an understanding of political and inter-organizational relations as well as creativity in finding solutions, resources and staff. Their behaviour is remarkably stronger and more effective than that of James McDonald.

The first UN Secretary-General needs more attention for his role in elaborating the Secretariat, because Lie, although less prepared than Drummond, focused on consolidating and expanding the political powers of the office. He took advantage of political and other crises to expand the powers of his office and gain recognition for his political role as UN Secretary-General. While the elaboration of the office is often related to Lie’s successor, it was Lie who initiated new procedures and elements, also if not mentioned in the Charter (such as the Special Representatives), established precedents for his successors and carved out a space for an activist Secretary-General. That the UN’s first regional commission (for Europe) became a permanent body resulted from the way Myrdal elaborated and led its Secretariat as an independent and scientifically based institution.

Focusing on the UN’s specialized agencies, UNESCO provides a troublesome case, as Huxley was politically and financially restricted. A secret agreement with the US limited his term in office to two years and a US deputy was appointed. Huxley created a pioneer spirit and attracted good staff but had poor administrative skills and limited political capacities, which gave the Secretariat a boost but did not make him an average executive head. UNICEF (set up thanks to Rajchman’s continued activities and awareness) found in Pate a Secretariat leader who had demands in advance (e.g. a clear line of authority from the UN Secretary General), handled inter-organizational competition well, made it a permanent organization, felt stimulated to innovation given UNICEF’s voluntary funding, responded quickly to crises and, when he thought this was necessary, adapted its course (from humanitarian to development). Chisholm succeeded in creating the WHO out of three older health organizations because he was a visionary supporter of a new worldwide organization with staff behaving as world citizens. However, he was unable to lead the WHO as an independent organization. He did not succeed in the integration of one of the three older organizations and did not find enough political support for his ideas. Frustrated with not being able to impose his views he retired early. UNHCR Van Heuven Goedhart had to start from scratch (a restricted mandate, strong US opposition and limited resources) and met with strong inter-organizational competition. He

proved creative in finding resources and good staff members, managed to control inter-organizational tensions, played a role in public opinion and renewed his mandate through a successful intervention during the Berlin crisis. The (mostly forgotten) Technical Assistance Administration was one of the few operational units of the UN Secretariat. Keenleyside kept a low profile and his room for manoeuvre depended on the Secretary-General (more autonomy under Lie than under Hammarskjöld). Keenleyside's operational leadership of his unit allowed the UN to position itself as a primary actor in global economics and to enhance the aspirations of developing states. Like Pate he managed voluntary funding. The Special Fund and the UNDP found in businessman Hoffman a long-time leader who focused on top-level negotiations and left the management of operations to his chief assistants. Able in bringing in money and building the UNDP from scratch, Hoffman eventually met with confirmed complaints about a top-heavy and misdirected administration, which resulted in early retirement. It can be concluded that the frontierspersons of the specialized agencies mentioned here have set up more and less successful secretariats.

Focusing on the UN-related IGOs in the economic and security fields, the IBRD's start was unsuccessful. Meyer recruited senior staff and set up the research department, distanced the organization from the UN, but had such sharp disagreements with the executive directors over procedures and his authority as president that he resigned within one year. Wyndham White's start at the GATT was quite different, as he and his small but skilful staff built up the infrastructure, mandate and legitimacy of an accidental organization. The Secretariat initiated and regularized meetings of contracting parties, widening the mandate and preparing for new rounds of tariff negotiations. The GATT thus became a de facto international organization with regular tariff negotiations through the leadership of its Executive Secretary, who then became Director-General. Credits for the IAEA's start should be given to the deputies rather than the first executive head, who lacked diplomatic and administrative experience. Cole demanded a rather high salary, set up costly projects, had difficult relations with the Board and with the US government and he created strong opposition to a second term. Bustani provides a different picture at the OPCW, as he set up a sound organizational culture with political standards and legal procedures motivated by the founding principles of the organization. He created effective relations between Secretariat and member states, promoted universal membership and developed a practice of coordination with the UN, formalized in a relationship agreement. His second term ended abruptly, when he proposed to admit Iraq and send inspectors there, which was rejected by the G.W. Bush administration. This resulted in Bustani's removal from office in a procedure that proved unlawful and invalid. Hence, a change of US foreign policy ended the internally and externally strong leadership.

Focusing on the three non-UN organizations, Marjolin had good relations with the US government, but also strove to increase the OEEC's autonomy from the US and its member states, a.o. through his staff policy. He organized the organization's statistical work and initiated policies in the field of multilateral payments and productivity and handled inter-organizational competition with NATO. The OEEC's last head was also the first head of the OECD and can be seen as both a 'reformer' and the OECD's frontiersperson. In both cases he managed to elaborate the secretariat of the new organization, which kept the statistical and research facilities of the old organization and provided a new regulation of the coordination of relations between the Western member states and their relationship with the global South. NATO's Secretariat was elaborated by Ismay who developed the roles related to an international civil service, defined and staffed the divisions and created the necessary infrastructure, also changing the relationship between military and political authorities as far as he could.

Table 1 summarizes the results with 16 out of 22 executive heads being successful 'combiners' of internal and external leadership and 2 partly successful 'combiners'. All cases show that personal factors in elaborating an international secretariat matter.

Table 1: Successful and Unsuccessful Secretariat Elaboration (N = 22)

Successful in Secretariat Elaboration	Combiner-ship	Comments	Unsuccessful in Secretariat Elaboration	Combiner-ship	Comments
<i>Nineteenth century IGOs</i>					
Eur. Danube Comm. Stokes	Yes	No secretariat design; Temporary start			
ITU Curchod	Yes	No secretariat design			
<i>League of Nations System</i>					
LoN Drummond	Yes	Creation Internat. Secretariat model			
Soc. Aff. Sect. Crowdy	Yes	Initiative by Secr.			
HCR Nansen	Yes	Initiative by Secr. Temporary start			
HO Rajchman	Yes	Initiative by Secr.			
			HCR Germany McDonald	No	Weak institution
<i>United Nations System</i>					
UN Lie	Yes	Favouring activist position SG			
ECE Myrdal	Yes	Temporary start			
<i>UN Specialized Agencies</i>					
			UNESCO Huxley	No	Created pioneer atmosphere; politically restricted
UNICEF Pate	Yes	Temporary start			
			WHO Chisholm	*	* Combiner in the beginning
UNHCR Van Heuven Goedhart	Yes	Temporary start			
TAA Keenleyside	Yes	Division UN Secretariat; dependent on SG			
			SF/UNDP Hoffman	**	** Elaborated SF/UNDP, but in the end mismanagement
<i>UN-Related Organizations</i>					
			IBRD Meyer	No	Lack of will
GATT Wyndham White	Yes	Accidental organization			
			IAEA Cole	No	Lack of capacities
OPCW Bustani	Yes	Interrupted			
<i>Some Non-UN IGOs</i>					
OEEC Marjolin	Yes				
OECD Kristensen	Yes	Continues OEEC			
NATO Ismay	Yes				
Total: 16	16		Total: 6		4 lack combinership

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