Fighting for Progress

The United Nations and the Struggle for Disarmament

PLUS

The Early League of Nations Experience on Disarmament

UN Targeted Sanctions
A framework for ongoing negotiations

AM15 details and updates
up2date news & opinions
MPub member publications
FEATURE ONE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT
Fighting for progress | 3
Angela Kane
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations

SPECIAL FEATURE:
THE EARLY LEAGUE OF NATIONS EXPERIENCE ON DISARMAMENT | 5
Sami Sarè
PhD, Fellow in History of International Relations, ‘Sapienza’ University of Rome-Italy

FEATURE TWO:
UN TARGETED SANCTIONS
A framework for ongoing negotiation | 7
Thomas Biersteker
Professor, International Relations/Political Science; Curt Gasteyger Chair in International Security and Conflict Studies, The Graduate Institute, Geneva

AM15 details and updates

THE UN AT 70: GUARANTEEING SECURITY AND JUSTICE

2015 ACUNS ANNUAL MEETING

THURSDAY - SATURDAY > June 11-13, 2015
The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the International Institute of Social Studies
The Netherlands
Vibrant dialogues and links

We’re preparing for both the 2015 ACUNS Annual Meeting and the Vienna Conference, going the distance to engage in dialogue with leaders, NGOs and scholars, developing new links in Japan, and engaging with the world on our new ‘Experts’ platform.

Dr. Alistair Edgar, ACUNS

I travel much less than it might appear, but once again I am writing this note while “on the road”. This time, from The Hague while Brenda and I have been making preparations for the 2015 Annual Meeting which will be held here, 11-13 June 2015, on the theme “The UN at 70: Guaranteeing Security and Justice”. We have wonderful institutional partners in The Hague Institute for Global Justice, led by ACUNS Chair Dr. Abiodun Williams, and the International Institute of Social Studies. In the latter case, it is a return journey since IISS was the host for the 1994 Annual Meeting, also held here in The Hague.

Before travelling to The Hague, I was delighted to participate in the second ACUNS-Global Governance-OEF workshop in New York, hosted by the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. This event featured David Bosco, discussing his GG article on the Security Council. Thanks to the generosity of Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski and his excellent Mission staff, and that of One Earth Future (OEF) Foundation, this event attracted several PRs and DPRs from current and recent Security Council members, as well as other Ambassadors and leaders of foundations and NGOs, and ACUNS scholars. This truly was academics and practitioners engaged in dialogue – not always in agreement, but in dialogue!

December will take me to Kyoto, Japan, to join the annual East Asia UN Studies Symposium of JAUNS, CANUNS and KACUNS – the UN studies associations of Japan, China and South Korea, respectively. I look forward very much to listening and learning from the presentations there, and to the chance to discuss new links between ACUNS and these three vibrant associations.

If you have the chance, it is very much worth considering attending the ACUNS Vienna conference, in mid-January 2015, organised each year since 2011 by the tremendous team of young and energetic ACUNS collaborators led by our “very own” and energetic Michael Platzer. Details are on the ACUNS web site and will be sent out also through the E-Update. I hope that I will see many of you there, in January before you come to The Hague in June.

I also hope that ACUNS members will decide to participate in the new initiative, our ACUNS Expert Directory. It is a new effort to engage in a venture that all of us find valuable – an opportunity to highlight individuals’ areas of expertise in research and in practice, to find potential new partnerships, and to help others to find you: including perhaps, UN agencies and bodies seeking external expertise.
ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, multilateral treaties were concluded to ban biological and chemical weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) outlawed the geographical spread of nuclear weapons and legally committed all its parties to undertake negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament. Five regional nuclear-weapon-free zones were established covering virtually the entire Southern Hemisphere and Central Asia. Other treaties excluded nuclear weapons from the seabed, the Antarctic, the moon, and earth orbit.

Last year, a major multilateral treaty established some norms governing the trade in conventional arms. One treaty outlawed or restricted the use of certain conventional arms that had uniquely inhumane effects. There are treaties banning anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. Another treaty banned the use of weather modification as a weapon. Awaiting entry into force is a treaty banning all nuclear tests.

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YET ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, talks on nuclear disarmament dragged on from the 1950s through the early 1960s and then ceased all together. Today, some 17,000 nuclear weapons remain—many on high-alert status—and most of the world’s population still lives in countries that either have nuclear weapons or are members of a nuclear alliance. Not one nuclear weapon has been destroyed pursuant to a treaty, bilateral or multilateral. Quite the contrary, the states with nuclear arsenals all have long-term, well-funded plans to modernize them and their delivery systems. None of the key WMD treaties has universal membership or is likely to achieve it any time soon. Efforts over many decades to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD have come to naught. The relevant UN institutions—the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament—have been deadlocked for years and the Security Council has avoided this issue, especially nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile, global military spending remains high at around $1.7 trillion a year, while pressing needs for social and economic development remain unmet.
The lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is particularly frustrating for most UN Member States. After all, no country wants to witness another use of a nuclear weapon—on that, all are agreed. And there is also overwhelming support at the UN for the view that disarmament offers the only absolute guarantee against the use of such weapons, a stance reaffirmed by consensus at two NPT review conferences. Yet the world continues to approach this “problem of preventing use” by means that fall short of disarmament—means that accord a central role to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. In short, the most reliable tool for addressing this global challenge seems to have been jettisoned in favor of one of the least reliable and most dangerous of all: namely, the assumption that deterrence will forever suffice to prevent another use of a nuclear weapon.

To be sure, the struggle at the UN for disarmament—especially nuclear disarmament—is not over and it will continue to be waged until it is achieved, thereby illustrating the truth of Dag Hammarskjöld’s oracular comment as early as 1955 that disarmament was a “hardy perennial” at the UN.

Concerned Member States and their many allies in civil society will ensure that this issue remains on the table. In recent years, two developments merit special attention in attempting to forecast the prospects for success. The first relates to the fact that multilateral disarmament deliberations are taking place in an increasingly open and democratic process, on at least two levels. This is especially apparent at the UN, an institution that comes closest to fully universal membership. As indicated in speeches and votes on resolutions, disarmament remains a subject of interest to a wide variety of Member States—at all levels of economic development, from all regions, regardless of the political differences among them. And participation from civil society is also diversifying—the proverbial “peace groups” are now not having to bear all the burdens of moving disarmament forward. A rainbow of groups is now supporting this cause, consisting of mayors, parliamentarians, women’s groups, human rights activists, lawyers, doctors, environmentalists, religious leaders, scholars, and many others.

And as democracy is coming to disarmament, so is the rule of law. The most recent development here relates to a growing campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons because of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of their use. Proponents are arguing persuasively that any such use would flagrantly violate international humanitarian law, human rights law, customary international law, and basic morality. Other attempts to strengthen the rule of law in disarmament consists of efforts to promote universal membership in the key multilateral WMD treaties, to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, and to negotiate new treaties, such as a fissile material treaty or a nuclear weapons convention. The rule of law has much to contribute to the success of disarmament, especially to the extent that certain key multilateral norms are enshrined into disarmament agreements—in particular, verification, transparency, irreversibility, universality and legal bindingness. It is precisely through the implementation of these legal norms that gives States the highest possible confidence in compliance by all the parties to such agreements.

While much of this article has focused on nuclear disarmament, the UN also has a mandate under the Charter in the area of the “regulation of armaments,” a term that in practice has long been associated with the development of certain constraints over the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of conventional arms. These constraints have long existed in the fields of international humanitarian law and customary international law, certainly longer than the UN has existed. Yet a few greel treaties have addressed specific conventional arms issues, as noted above as positive achievements. On a political dimension, the world community has also agreed on a “programme of action” to prevent the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and its participating states meet biennially to consider its implementation.

The obstacles to eliminating nuclear weapons are enormous, yet there are also many difficulties in limiting or reducing conventional arms. Restraints over arms transfers, for example, assume the existence of States that are capable of issuing export licenses and monitoring compliance with them. Yet a brief glance at the armed conflicts raging around us in 2014—aggravated by a large black market of weaponry flowing to non-state groups—casts doubt on that assumption. Effective arms control also assumes the existence of a political will to limit arms supplies, which unfortunately has been in short supply.

These, then—the elimination of WMD and the limitation of conventional arms—form what amounts to the “double helix” of disarmament’s DNA at the UN. They are pursued simultaneously because they are mutually reinforcing. Member States recognized as early as 1946 that even a world without nuclear weapons would not necessarily be peaceful and secure, hence the need for constraints also over conventional weapons. One of the most common arguments used by critics of nuclear disarmament is that it would leave the world free to conduct conventional wars. The original architects of disarmament long ago understood that WMD disarmament and conventional arms control were both indispensable.

As significant as these goals are, however, even together they are not sufficient to produce world peace. That requires universal compliance with other key norms of the UN Charter, including the duty to resolve disputes peacefully, the prohibition of the use of force, limitations on acts of “self defense,” progress in meeting the world’s social and economic development needs, the advancement of human rights, and growth of the international rule of law. In their own way, these solemn goals also contribute to international peace and security.

The struggle for disarmament, therefore, is part of a larger challenge of realizing the full promise of the international security system found in the Charter. While disarmament alone cannot produce world peace,
The League of Nations (forerunner of the UN) was an international agreement which introduced the possibility to abolish war; today this possibility is considered almost ridiculous, but at that time, after a devastating conflict, such a solution was deemed simply necessary. Disrupting a world order based on the balance of powers, meaning relations between strong and weaker states, appeared to be a feasible endeavor undertaken by politicians of the highest level. The focus is on the efforts of men who participated in the 1919 Peace Conference and were profoundly shocked by the sheer violence they had to endure in their daily life during World War I. These individuals tried to build a community of world peoples, setting out rules that would make real a peaceful coexistence.

At the beginning of this quest different national characters with their fundamental values, but also fears and flaws, emerged in the discussions of the many projects of the Covenant. For example, the faith in democracy of the United States, according to which all countries, great and small, must act on the world stage as equal: States, according to which all countries, great and small, must act on the world stage as equal: a mission accompanied by an attitude to lead in small, must act on the world stage as equal: States, according to which all countries, great and small, must act on the world stage as equal: a mission accompanied by an attitude to lead and with its own administrative structure.

But probably the major utopia resided in the ideal of a future disarmament, according to the security of each country, as wished by Wilson in Article IV of his ‘Fourteen Points’. In the initial versions of the Covenant, the matter of disarmament was hardly discussed. Then Wilson put the item at the beginning of his first outline, and from then on also the wording of this Article changed following the evolution of the different plans. Certainly the theme came to life thanks to General Smuts, who, in his pamphlet, argued the economic and financial implications of this choice.

Men such as House, Cecil, Miller, Bliss, Anzilotti, Percy, Bourgeois, and Hurst, were deeply engaged in drafting successive copies of the treaty, which surely reflected the personal culture and the professional attitude, in addition to the national interests, of their respective governments. So the fundamental topics related to disarmament dealt with by the Commission on the League of Nations, instituted during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, were three: the exact phrasing and the composition of the Article on the reduction of armaments; the construction of the mechanism to resolve international controversies; the creation of the Secretariat which played an important function in coordinating the various committees dedicated to disarmament.

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The letters regarding the accomplishment of the ‘Commission on Disarmament’ (foreseen in the Covenant) show the doubts of men who, right from the beginning, expressed frank questions to each other on the manner to achieve the final result. While the countries’ positions were known, the concrete difficulties faced in pursuing disarmament were not.

The original roughs of the pact’s proposals, and the work of the Commission on the League of Nations, were endorsed by famous personalities such as Leonard and Virginia Woolf, testifying to the relevance which the issue raised in the intellectual community.

But some aspects of the problem have to be enlightened, because despite the official pronouncements, in the very early projects on the League of Nations, disarmament was almost absent.

In the first British plan on the League, written mainly by one of the most expert British jurists, Lord Phillimore, there was no mention of disarmament. Nor were there rules on the limitation of armaments in Lord Cecil’s sketches, except for the arms traffic destined to the colonies, even if the son of Lord Salisbury was really concerned about it.

In the French project, conceived thanks to a commission headed by Léon Bourgeois, disarmament was a matter to be faced later: the important thing was to create an international army. The discussion focused on the possibility to have a centralized chief of staff preparing a military plan for contingents ready to intervene in case of a sudden attack of whatever enemy, but given how this notion would affect national sovereignty, it is not clear how the League would have coordinated its military means.

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perhaps the protagonists thought that rendering workable the limitation of armaments was a sign of modernity, and not an old utopia never achievable since only force was considered the ultimate element able to regulate international relations.

Italy had more urgent problems to resolve and some hints on disarmament seemed to be incidentally included in the ‘Scheme’ on the League of Nations, probably channeling Wilson's will, in spite of the accurate formulation of the Italian Articles, edited by Dioniisio Anziliotti and introducing the composition and functions of the Council.

The disarmament of Germany was imposed by the Allies, a difficult rule to bear; however, this country outlined a provision on the limitation of the annual budget spent for armaments, an item utilized later by the League for some resolutions on the matter.

South African General Smuts inserted the abolition of conscription in his project, following a logic dictated by his ‘brilliant’ political approach to the question. Anyway disarmament was one of the last issues dealt with, because, of course, priority was given to the mandates’ system. What has to be underlined is that Smuts tackled even the question of expenses for military arrangements in the pamphlet and considered industrial interests to be at the basis of the armaments race.

Wilson himself moved the Article on disarmament from the last position to the Fourth Article, giving it much more importance: he really trusted the role of public opinion in condemning violence.

It has been very interesting to analyze the concepts intervening in the construction of the disarmament Article, which finally became Article Eight, because it highlighted the arguments at stake and contemplated not only technical issues, but also political ones. For example the key role of the League in controlling the traffic in armaments would involve a diminution of states’ sovereignty on the economic activity of each country, even if the organization was never thought to have the powers of a ‘super-state’.

At any rate the fundamental matters of the debate were: the reduction of armaments, the abolition of compulsory military service, and the prohibition of private manufacture of arms.

The reduction of armaments was intended for each state to be a cap on the numbers of soldiers and arms permitting for self-defense and the pursuit of international obligations in the military domain. The abolition of compulsory military service was opposed especially by the small states, in theory the most favored by disarmament. If Italy noticed that it couldn’t maintain a voluntary army because this solution

Continued on page 9 >
the UN Security Council has imposed targeted sanctions on parties to a conflict (both states and non-state actors) in twenty-four countries. That is an average of nearly one country sanctions regime per year. There are currently fifteen UN sanctions regimes in place. Most of the sanctions are imposed to resolve situations of armed conflict (nearly 60% of the cases) calling for a ceasefire, negotiations, peace enforcement or peacebuilding. But counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation, opposition to non-constitutional changes of government, support for democracy, and responsibility to protect also have been invoked as reasons for the imposition of sanctions by the Council. Human rights are nearly always invoked in the texts of resolutions, but are rarely the principal reason for the imposition of sanctions by the UN.
UNTIL RECENTLY, THERE HAS BEEN NO SYSTEMATIC ATTEMPT TO EVALUATE ANALYTICALLY THE IMPACTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MEASURES.

Targeted sanctions are qualitatively different from comprehensive sanctions, because they can more readily be employed in on-going negotiations with a targeted party. Unlike comprehensive measures, which are, in effect, an all or nothing proposition (which often foreclose bargaining and negotiation), targeted sanctions can be utilized as a tool of bargaining, to be ratcheted upward or relaxed downward, depending on actions taken by the target. Hence, contrary to popular opinion, they are not an alternative to negotiations, but can be an integral part of them. All current UN targeted sanctions are employed in a framework of on-going negotiations, either by the UN or by regional organizations.

Despite the fact that targeted sanctions have virtually become the policy instrument of choice when the UN Security Council decides to take decisive action in a conflict, until recently, there has been no systematic attempt to evaluate analytically the impacts and effectiveness of the measures. That is why in 2009, we formed the Targeted Sanctions Consortium, a group of more than fifty scholars and policy practitioners worldwide, to examine them. Co-directed by myself at the Graduate Institute, Geneva and Sue Eckert at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, the project has thus far produced two practitioner’s guides, two databases (one qualitative and one quantitative), delivered briefings in New York and Geneva, as well as in a number of major capitals, published articles, book chapters, reports, and a forthcoming book (Targeting Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of UN Action, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2015), and developed an application for mobile phones and interactive devices, SanctionsApp. The App is free, available at the Apple Store and Google Play (for Android devices) and Version 2.0 of SanctionsApp will be released in October 2014.

Two conceptual innovations have motivated the project. First, rather than try to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions in a single country regime – some of which have been in place for more than twenty years, with different targets, types of sanctions, and changing purposes – we analyse the impacts and effectiveness of the measures within what we call “sanction episodes.” Thus, our core unit of analysis is a sanctions episode within a country sanctions regime, rather than the entire country case, as is common in most evaluations of sanctions. Second, rather than focus exclusively on whether sanctions have succeeded or failed in coercing a target to change its behaviour, we also look at whether the measures have constrained a target’s activity. More than one-fifth of the UN’s resolutions imposing targeted sanctions do not call for specific actions to be taken by the target, but rather focus on constraining their activities. We also examine whether an effective signal has been sent by the Council, since all sanctions are engaged in signalling about contemporary international norms. Thus, we evaluated each sanctions episode with regard to the extent to which the principal target has been effectively coerced, constrained, or signalled.

We measure the effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions as a function of two variables: the policy outcome (or degree to which a target has been coerced, constrained and/or signalled on a five point scale) and the UN sanctions contribution to that outcome (on a six point scale from negative to significant). We consider targeted sanctions to be effective only if they score a four or five in policy outcome and at least a three or higher in sanctions contribution (where the UN sanctions at least reinforced other policy measures). Based on an analysis of 63 different case episodes for each of the three purposes of sanctions – to coerce, constrain, and/or signal – we found that UN targeted sanctions are effective about 20% of the time (weighting each purpose equally). More interesting is the finding that while UN targeted sanctions are effective in coercing a change in behaviour only 10% of the time, they are nearly three times as effective when attempting to constrain and/or signal a target (27% of the time).

Arms embargoes are the most popular type of targeted sanction (present in 87% of the case episodes), but they are never effective when imposed alone, or without any other types of targeted sanctions to complement them. Indeed, there are no effective episodes in which less than three different types of targeted sanctions are imposed, and the average is closer to four types imposed simultaneously. Commodity sanctions imposed in African conflict situations tend to be effective measures and secondary sanctions imposed on a neighbouring country, though rare (in only two instances) are 100% effective.

The degree of discrimination of targeted sanctions varies – from sanctions imposed on individuals, which are the most targeted, to financial and oil sector sanctions which affect an entire population and are therefore the least discriminating targeted measures. With the exception of Libya in 2011, UN sanctions tend to be relatively targeted. Unlike US and EU measures against Iran, the UN sanctions remain relatively targeted on individuals and firms engaged in the country’s nuclear and missile technology programs.

Keeping targeted sanctions targeted is one of the major challenges facing the instrument. There is a widespread belief that broader, more comprehensive sanctions are not only more forceful measures, but they are also more likely to be effective. This is not necessarily the case, however. Targeted sanctions should be used efficiently, with as little as necessary to ensure the maximum impact on the target (whether the goal is to coerce a change in behaviour, constrain some proscribed activity, or send a clear signal). They can always be strengthened (ratcheted upward) later, if the target proves unresponsive in the first iteration of bargaining.
it has much to contribute in building the confidence needed to make peace possible. This makes the struggle for disarmament worthwhile especially at the UN, the birthplace of global norms. The greatest obstacles are not found in the UN organization per se, but in the chronic differences of priorities and perceived interests among its Member States that have prevented greater progress.

Overcoming those differences will depend largely upon political forces working inside each country, especially the countries possessing nuclear weapons or belonging to nuclear alliances. Once it is better understood that disarmament is very much the will of the people—due both to ideals and national self-interest—the leaders will follow, the policies will be adjusted, and new progress will emerge. For disarmament advocates, only one thing is more important than joining this struggle—and that is winning it.

*Ms. Angela Kane of Germany assumed the position of High Representative for Disarmament Affairs in March 2012. She provides the Secretary-General with advice and support on all arms control, non-proliferation and related security matters and is responsible for the activities of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. Ms. Kane has had a long and distinguished career in the United Nations. In addition to substantive assignments in political affairs, peacekeeping and disarmament, she has held various managerial functions, including with financial and policy-setting responsibility. She served as Under-Secretary-General for Management from 2008-2012, overseeing human resources, financial management, procurement and support services and the renovation of the United Nations New York Headquarters campus.

SEEKING NOMINATIONS: ACUNS BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Nominate or be nominated.

AS OF JUNE 2015 multiple positions will be open on the ACUNS Board of Directors. Board members will serve from 2015 – 2018. ACUNS members are invited to nominate qualified individuals, including themselves, for these positions. All nominees should be members of ACUNS. Please send nominations with:

- Curriculum vitae
- Bio (300-500 words)
- A short supporting statement outlining what the nominee will bring to ACUNS.

**TO NOMINATE**

> All nominations will be accepted from January 1, 2015 to March 31, 2015. Nominations should be sent to bburns@wlu.ca.

Questions? Please email admin@acuns.org or call (1) 226.772.3121

There were many contradictions in the various plans dealing with disarmament, nevertheless the League was an attempt to realize a project never seen before, and it is not possible to deny the ‘good faith’ of men wanting to accomplish such a result, also considering the inevitable failures, and even if governments were skeptical.

Perhaps the protagonists thought that rendering workable the limitation of armaments was a sign of modernity, and not an old utopia never achievable since only force was considered the ultimate element able to regulate international relations. The League of Nations was a ‘Great Experiment’ which sprang from the desolation of war. Its proponents sought a global solution based on mutual understanding and on a rational attitude. The hope is still alive and the concrete side of the question is well enlightened by the disarmament section chief of the League of Nations Secretariat, Salvador de Madariaga, in his book entitled ‘Disarmament’ (1929):

“A rough-and-ready method of calculating the material loss involved in armaments is to add up the ‘defence’ budgets of all the nations of the world. This sum amounts nowadays to about 3,856 million dollars. Yet a figure in itself speaks less eloquently to the mind than a comparison of figures. Now, if the total obtained by adding up the ‘defence’ budgets of all the Members of the League for one year only were set aside, even neglecting the interest accumulated on the unspent sums (no small concessions indeed) the capital thus secured would suffice to meet the present expenses of the League of Nations (including the World Court and the International Labour Office) for about six centuries. This means that the world (even if the United States, Russia, Mexico, Turkey, Ecuador, Egypt, and Afghanistan are left aside) is nowadays spending in preparing for war six hundred times the sum which it devotes to preparing for peace.

*Samí Sarè has a Degree in Political Sciences (History of Treaties and International Politics) at ‘Sapienza’ University of Rome-Italy. He holds a PhD and is a Fellow in History of International Relations. Dr. Sarè has authored two books: “Risorse fitogenetiche e svolta nelle relazioni Nord/Sud. Il trattato internazionale FAO del 2001” [Plant Genetic Resources and Change in North/South Relations. The 2001 FAO International Treaty], Franco Angeli Publisher, December 2009 and “The League of Nations and the Debate on Disarmament (1918-1919),” published by Nuova Cultura, October 2013.*
Targeted sanctions are more complex to design and implement than comprehensive sanctions. There should be as much strategic planning in the design of targeted sanctions as there is in the use of military force. Careful thought should be given to their unintended consequences, to the likely coping and evasion strategies of targets, and to an end game. It is easier to impose sanctions than it is to lift them, which may explain why the UN currently has fifteen different country sanctions regimes in place.

Finally, it is important to raise the quality of the public, policy, and scholarly discourse about sanctions. There are too many platitudes about sanctions – they don’t work, they are less effective than the use of force, they are an alternative to negotiation, that broader measures will be more effective. It is time to raise the level of the debate and discourse about sanctions, and that has been one of the principal goals of the Targeted Sanctions Consortium from the outset.

* Thomas Biersteker is the Gasteyer Professor of International Security and Conflict Studies and Director of the Programme for the Study of International Governance. He is the author/editor/co-editor of nine books, including “State Sovereignty as Social Construct” (1996), “The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance” (2002), and “Countering the Financing of Terrorism” (2007). He is currently completing an edited volume on UN Targeted Sanctions as Instruments of Global Governance. His current research focuses on UN targeted sanctions, the emergence of transnational policy networks in global security governance, and the dialectics of world orders. He was the principal developer of SanctionsApp, a tool for iPhone and Android mobile devices created in 2013 to increase access to information and improve the quality of discourse about targeted sanctions at the UN Security Council.

ACUNS ANNUAL MEETING
CALL FOR PAPERS - WORKSHOP PANELS

In June 2015, the ACUNS Annual Meeting celebrates the 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. In cooperation with our host institutions; The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the International Institute of Social Studies, ACUNS invites its members, and other interested scholars and practitioners, to join us in The Hague to engage in critical, informed discussions of the achievements, the deficits and the ongoing challenges of the United Nations system in nurturing, developing, promoting and defending ideas and practices of security and justice in global governance.

The full text of the Call for Papers is available at acuns.org/am2015

ANNUAL MEETING THEME
The UN at 70: Guaranteeing Security and Justice

The Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) is now accepting workshop paper and panel proposals for presentation at 2015 Annual Meeting. Proposals on the Annual Meeting theme – “The United Nations at 70: Guaranteeing Security and Justice” – and on the subthemes and issues raised in the introductory note, in addition to other topics relating to the UN system and the broader mandate of the Council, will be considered.

In addition to individual workshop paper proposals addressing these and related matters, the ACUNS Secretariat this year will welcome a small number of special, full-panel proposals featuring ACUNS members reflecting on questions related specifically to marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

Current ACUNS members in good standing (including new or newly-renewed members) will be given priority consideration for their proposals, but non-members are welcome to submit proposals.

NB In order to present at the AM15 workshops, Council membership will be required: this includes all persons participating in a full panel team proposal.

The deadline for uploading your proposals is Monday, April 13, 2015.

QUESTIONS? > Please contact the ACUNS Secretariat at admin@acuns.org or 226.772.3121

For general questions about the Council and its activities, please contact:
Dr. Alistair D. Edgar, Executive Director, ACUNS, Wilfrid Laurier University
T 226.772.3167 E aedgar@wlu.ca

APPLICATION PROCEDURE

Submissions: To submit an individual proposal or a full panel proposal, you will be required to upload full contact information, the paper/panel title(s), abstract(s) of no more than 200 words, biographical note(s) of no more than 200 words, and biographical notes of no more than 250 words.

Proposals: Proposals will be accepted and evaluated, and panel spaces will be allotted, on a first-come rolling basis subsequent to the issuance of this Call. Once all panel spaces have been filled, a waiting list will be established for any subsequent proposals that are received.

Registration: Once your proposal is accepted you are required to register for the 2015 Annual Meeting at acuns.org/am2015

Registration Fees are available online at acuns.org

We will be filling workshops on a rolling basis. Once all spaces are filled there will be a waiting list for spaces.
MEMBERSHIP FORM
INDIVIDUAL

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 □ I would like to receive information on ACUNS events in New York

2 MEMBERSHIP TYPE
Institutional Memberships also are available at acuns.org
ACUNS memberships are based on the January to December calendar year. If you join mid-year, you will receive back issues of Global Governance and the ACUNS quarterly newsletter. If you have any questions regarding joining mid-year, please contact the Secretariat at admin@acuns.org.

Please note that membership fees are in U.S. Funds.

□ $425 (Extended 5-year Term) □ $155 (Sponsoring)* □ $95 (Over $40,000 income)
□ $70 (Up to $40,000 income) □ $50 (Retired) □ $50 (Student)
*In addition to your own, sponsor a new one-year membership for a person from a developing country.

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